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    Abstract 
Often seen as a passion project or part of a philanthropic venture, rare and fine stringed instruments offer an 
exciting option to diversify one’s investment portfolio while providing an opportunity for an exceptional long-
term investment. Though, historically rare violins have not been widely recognized as assets for investment, 
this category is gaining interest due to its steady increase in value, a lively international market and a finite and 
diminishing supply. This study demonstrates that fine stringed instruments offer a steady increase of 
approximately 3,7-6,9% return per annum with a dramatic percentage increase since the 80’s.  
In this thesis, the stringed instrument public auction and private dealer markets are reviewed, the price 
dynamics are studied, and some fundamental intra market specific limitations are tackled in order to observe 
the true underlying returns of this asset. In order to build solid conclusions, the largest fine stringed instrument 
auction database has been developed encompassing the period from 1850 until today, although for the analysis 
a focus is put in the period from the 1980’s until today, as it is when the demand and, consequently the market 
for violins boomed.  
The thesis main contributions can be summarized as follows. First, I review and explain the increased attention 
in recent global violin auction markets and the violin segments’ specific limitations. Second, I construct a price 
index by the use of the hedonic regression model and address major market inefficiencies such as market 
illiquidity and transaction costs with techniques such as the unsmoothing returns. Third, I investigate violins 
investment’s diversification potential as well as the optimal portfolio allocation weight when including violins. 
From the results, violins in a portfolio can improve the risk-return characteristics; however, the amelioration 
depends mainly on some characteristics such as the maker. This is why I pursue the research by a first targeted 
study which examines the ‘masterpiece effect’ within the violin market by using a repeated sales database of 
337 observations and concluding that Stradivari and Guarnieri del Gesù should be unquestionably the most 
preferred makers and therefore have the highest investment opportunity within violins, especially, when 
traded privately through dealers. A second study explores a completely novel topic, the ‘musician effect’ on 
the price of violins. This new idea reaches the conclusion that violins that have been played by most talented 
musicians reveal a higher price. By using event study to isolate the ‘musician effect’, it is found that musicians 
change in preferences over specific instruments translates as a revision in violin ratings by further pushing 
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1.1. Market Overview  
It is estimated the global violin market for rare stringed instruments, those made over 
150 years ago by the top 270 makers, to be approximately $16.2 billion1, and it is seen form 
the repeated database that this market turns over every 32 years, making this market financially 
illiquid. Further, the market for asset-secured lending has grown over the past ten years, with 
the market size in 2019 estimated to be around 50 million in outstanding loans against violins2.  
If we compare these figures to the art market, we see that the global art market grew 6% 
in 2019 to $67.4 billion in sales3. In the fine stringed market, unlike the art market, there’s no 
sense that anything contemporary is ever going to outsell an old master. This is because late 
17th and early-18th instruments are unique in quality as the climate 300 years ago was cooler, 
which meant that trees grew more slowly, resulting in wood that was denser and more resonant.   
 
The number of stringed instruments from the 17th century is limited. If we look into top 
makers, such as Stradivari and Guarnieri del Gesù, today we can only account for about 700 
good quality violins, according to Tarisio auction house founder and history expert Jason Price.  
In the course of the years, the supply of violins in circulation has been diminished due to 
various factors. Firstly, the museums and private collections buy premium violins with no 
intention of selling them in future. Secondly, the violins are material goods with specific risks. 
Indeed, the violins are prone to suffer from depreciation risks as well as the risk of being burnt, 
destroyed, or lost. Nevertheless, the demand has continuously grown and the competition for 
these items is therefore fierce, resulting in escalating prices.  
Like art, wine and other passion investments, violins are targeted by those investors 
trying to diversify risk and, at the same time, wishing to find an artistic enjoyment from their 
investments. The differences in prices depend on the state of the instrument, their provenance 
and their historic performance. Indeed, the violins played by renown musicians are more valued 
than the rest. The best way to ensure the value of an instrument is to loan it to a first-class 
musician. The wood of the violin is “a work in progress”, as it is made of living matter. The 
acoustic properties of the instrument change depending on the vibrations perceived. This means 
 
1 Kenneth Research (2017), Violin Market: Advancements and Efficient Clinical Outcomes would drive the industry growth. 
Also see, Nobuyoshi Ozawa (2004) Orchestrated Instruments, Inc., University of Cincinnati. 
2 Deloitte 2019 6th edition report, p.120. 
3 McAndrew's report “The Art Market 2019” released by Art Basel and UBS. 
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that a violin which has not been played for various years has a more aggressive sound and it is 
more difficult to play than a frequently used one. The fact of lending violins to renown 
musicians brings a number of advantages to the investor. Firstly, this allows to guarantee the 
quality of the instrument, as the musician will be using it regularly. Further, the investment 
value will increase as the violin will be the gage of success of the musician. As mentioned 
above, the value of the violin increases depending on the reputation of the musicians that have 
played it in the past - this is, the more famous becomes the musician and its violin, the best for 
the investor. We will explore into this phenomenon later in this thesis. 
Investing in violins has, therefore, advantages and disadvantages. Investing in violins 
does not give dividends, violins have high insurance costs and, are sensitive to atmospheric 
conditions (E.g. humidity, etc.). On the other hand, it is a functional investment that allows the 
musician the joy of playing a high-quality instrument (and if the investor is not a musician, it 
gives him/her the opportunity to listen to the instrument’s music at his/her premises whenever 
the investor wants to). This is, in addition to its financial value, there is an aesthetic value to 
take account of. 
In order to have an overview of the current existing numbers of violins, I have 
constructed a surviving units table from my own internal analysis. 
 










G B Guadagnini 300
Joseph Guarnieris Jr. 250
Petrus Guarnieris of Venice 200
Andrea	Guarnieri 200
Guarnieri del Gesu 165
Rogeri 150
Carlo Bergonzi 100





1.2. Market Limitations 
Simply by looking to the number of current surviving units, we can conclude that the 
market for fine stringed instruments is thin. There is a shortage of existence and decreasing 
which challenges the structures of building funds. This illiquidity limitation will need to be 
taken into account for a realistic result.  
Another point to note is that the funding structure of this segment is based on 
borrowing. The schemes to purchase rare stringed instruments are borrowing from banks that 
specialize in loaning funds against musical instruments and assembling syndicates to raise 
money, and similarly to a jockey in a horse race, the musical instrument is then rented to a 
musician. The musician typically pays all insurance costs (0.5% - 2% of the value) as well as 
maintenance costs but not the rental fee. 
Two investment strategies prevail amongst traders and investors - a dynamic versus a 
buy-and-hold strategy. Here, market is not being actively traded as we can see that the average 
holding period from the repeated database is 32 years, therefore it has low volume—meaning, 
the number of violins traded is low which translates into a large spread, as bid and ask prices 
fall far apart. 
Another concern of this market are the high commission costs, specially, when 
stringed instruments are sold through auction houses, which translate into a 20-25% 
commission fee. Therefore, we should investigate this further by looking into differences 
between violins sold through auction houses and those sold via private dealers. This will be 
explored in the first targeted study. The dynamics are different in terms of goods traded (rarest 
instruments tend to be found more often within the private dealers’ sector); prices reached seem 
to be higher within violins traded privately; commissions differ (up to 25% in auction houses 
versus 5% with private dealers); market dynamics differ (trade-ins are allowed in private sales); 
also, the transparency of pricing differs (public auctions are more reliable in reporting prices 
than private dealers who are more opaque due to confidentiality restrictions). 
Most of these concerns have been tacked throughout this thesis. 
 
On a more positive note, restricted supply and increasing demand from markets such 
as Russia, China and Korea have accelerated the gains for rare and fine instruments. Large 
institutional buyers have not only created more competition, but have placed pressure on the 
rare stringed instrument market by reducing the number of instruments on the open market, 
which undeniably accounts for the continued increase in prices on the international scene, and 
has escalated demand. 
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The thesis will start by exploring, with the use of the unique database constructed, the 
viability of violins as an investment opportunity after tackling most of the above-mentioned 
concerns. I will continue by building indices using the hedonic regression method and 
assessing, by portfolio optimization techniques, the viability of stringed instruments as an 
alternative asset class. Then, two targeted studies will focus on two major market specific 
topics: the so called ‘masterpiece effect’ and ‘musician effect’.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Ross and Zondervan (1989) examine a repeat sales dataset of 17 Stradivarius that were 
bought and sold a total of 29 times between 1803 and 1982. They find an average real return 
over this period of approximately 2 percent, equal to the long-run real rate of interest. 
Unfortunately, by focusing only on one maker there is a bias. 
Graddy and Margolis (2007) measure the returns to investing in violins using two 
different datasets. One dataset includes 75 observations on repeat sales of the same violins at 
auction starting in the mid-19th century and another dataset includes over 2000 observations 
on individual violin sales at auction since 1980. The overall real returns for the dataset on repeat 
sales for the period 1850-2006 that they calculate, is approximately 3.3%. And, the real returns 
to their overall portfolio of individual sales since 1980 is nearly 4%. They conclude that while 
this return is lower than other standard investments, the price path has been stable with a slight 
negative correlation to stocks and bonds. The new database will improve this study by raising 
the number of observations to 16,707 and expanding the period until the end of 2019. Further, 
techniques to overcome market specific limitations such as desmoothening results will be 
applied for more accurate results as well as studying market specific relevant topics. 
Dimson and Christophe Spaenjers in their paper “The investment performance of art and 
other collectibles” construct a price index, by borrowing data on repeated sales of violins from 
Graddy and Margolis (2011). They construct a real annual price index for the period 1900 to 
2009 by applying the same repeat-sales regression method as Goetzmann, Renneboog, and 
Spaenjers (2011). Their deflated average price appreciation since end-1899 equals 2.5% (the 
nominal equivalent is 6.5%.). This study does not cover the financial crisis period. 
Campbell (2007) uses the Florian Leonhard Index with repeat sales in the period 1986 to 
2006 and calculates an average annual real return of 9.64% with a standard deviation of 8.41%. 
Unfortunately, this dataset is biased as focuses mainly in reported private sales by one trader. 
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There have been few other attempts to measure returns to violins, but these studies have 
not used auction data nor have they been published in refereed journals. These studies include, 
“Orchestrated Investment, Inc.” that in 1999 used price estimates listed in Fuchs Taxe der 
Streichinstrumente, a German publication that estimates prices for the violin market. It shows 
that from 1960-1996, Italian violins had increased on average 11.7% per year in price. And 
also, The Economist magazine which published in 2009 a short article including the price index 
from Florian Leonhard Fine Violins. 
 
 3. Database 
3.1 Data on Individual Sales 
           The database constructed for this thesis during the past years is currently the largest 
reference resource for buyers, sellers and connoisseurs of fine stringed instruments and bows. 
According to experts4, the most important players in the public market now dealing 
with fine instruments are the following auction houses: Tarisio, Ingels&Hayday, Bromptons 
and Vichy. In the past, before the year 2000, major auction houses included Sotheby’s, 
Christie’s, Phillips, and Bonham’s. In 2016, Tarisio provided me with their public registry of 
iconography, provenance and pricing information for historical stringed instruments. The raw 
initial database, had some missing periods due to changes in strategies of individual auction 
houses. I completed them by contacting auction houses individually for specific data points, 
with the help of The Red Book5 and, by consulting old auction catalogues such as the Puttick 
and Simpson catalogues from Bonham’s in British Library.  
The overall database encompasses over 36,000 individual instruments and bows by 
over 3,500 makers and contains over 57,000 historical auction prices. For a more detailed 
information about database construction see note below.6 
 
4 Christie’s on phone call 17th of November 2014. Tarisio’s email sent on the 9th of February 2017. 
5 The Red Book Auction Price Guide of Authentic Stringed Instruments and Bows is a comprehensive public record of auction 
prices paid for violin-family instruments and bows. It features worldwide sale results from the major auction houses of Austria, 
England, France, Germany, Italy, and the United States from 1997 to 2012 and contains almost 24,000 auction sales representing 
the works of more than 4,300 instrument makers. The sales are listed alphabetically by maker, sub grouped by instruments, and 
arranged chronologically by sales dates. Prices are given in U.S. dollars, British pounds and Euro.   
6 The initial dataset had complete data from Sotheby’s London, as the fine instrument department was based in London. There 
is data since its creation in 1966 until 2012. In 2013, Sotheby’s became Ingels&Hayday in the database when Tim and Paul 
decided to set up their own auction house after 18 and 15 years of experience, respectively, in Sotheby’s (The Strad Magazine, 
4th of January 2013: http://www.ingleshayday.com/component/content/article/33-press/general/205-tim-ingles-and-paul-
hayday-leave-sothebys-to-set-up-own-auction-firm.html). From 2013, under Ingels&Hayday, there is data available until today 
after having contacted them directly (Samantha Rowe facilitated the data through spreadsheet.).  
For Christie’s London, there is data from 1972 until 2005. In 2005 Christie’s stopped holding musical instrument sales in London 
and concentrated its musical instrument business in New York. In 2005 James Buchanan left Christie’s to create Brompton’s 
Auctioneer’s (https://tarisio.com/press/tarisio-announces-european-expansion/). From Christie’s New York office, there is 
existing data from 1979 to1986. During the dates of 1986 until 2000 there were only two musical instrument sales held in New 
York; one in November 1994 and one in May 2000. After contacting Mr. Keane, now the data is completed until 2012. Since 
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Therefore, the dataset on individual sales that spans from 1850 until 2019, is constructed 
by merging data on violin sales from various datasets provided mainly by Tarisio auction house 
and completed by other sources. Instruments included are sold by the major auction houses: 
Sotheby’s, Christie’s, Bonham’s, Phillips, Tarisio, Bongartz and Skinner as well as other 
auction venues. In addition, as explained before, the catalogues and auction houses’ websites 
have been checked to ensure that the database only includes full-size instruments represented 
in good physical condition with information on: varnish, age, authenticity, LOB, location sold 
and listed by individual maker. These characteristics will be included in the regressions as are 
recognized to have an influence on price. In the Annex, a more descriptive information on the 
importance of each of these variables included in the study is available.  
Altogether, the general database consists of violins by more than 2,945 different makers 
spanning four centuries and representing virtually all of the important schools of violin making. 
The database consists of 25,930 violins, 2,814 cellos and 2,946 violas. We have 1,047 locations 
where the sales took place, where top cities are London, Paris and New York. The sample 
database used for this thesis encompasses 16,707 fully completed observations from 1980 until 
end of 2019. Tables 2- 1-4 provide summary statistics for this database.         
         Within the database, some records are omitted after deleting incomplete observations. 
We winsorized the observations with extreme low values, such as those with prices less than 
50 USD. This reduced the impact of inconsistent outliers, which might come from data entry 
errors, cleaning blind issue, inferior maker or level conditions, etc. Therefore, we had to limit 




1999, Mr. Kerry Keane has been the main consultant in fine instruments and since 2012 he has been on the head of Private Sales 
in Christie’s (http://www.thestrad.com/christies-quits-instrument-auctions-for-private-sales/). 
Brompton’s London fine instrument department was created by James Buchanan (ex-Christies) and Peter Horner (ex-Bonham’s 
1991-2005) in 2005 (https://www.bromptons.co/about/team/peter-horner.html).  There is original data since the first auction in 
2006 until 2012, when Buchanan left to Amati. The 2013, 2014 and 2015 years have been completed by public information 
from online catalogues. 
As for Amati, there was not original data since its opening in 2013 by James Buchanan (ex-Bonham’s), the 14 auctions until 
today were missing. Therefore, these years were completed after contacting them directly. 
For Bonham’s there was data 1992 to 2015. In 2015, it closed its musical instrument department with Philip Scott 
(http://www.thestrad.com/bonhams-auction-house-closes-musical-instrument-department/). The data for the period 1986-1991 
was completed after contacting them. 
Phillips merges in 2001 with Bonham’s and Philip Scott takes the role of head department until 2015. In the database, the data 
seems to be missing for the whole period, but it is under Bonham’s auction house. 
Tarisio New York was Founded in 1999 and there is complete data since then. There is data as well since the London office 
launched in 2007 (https://tarisio.com/press/tarisio-announces-european-expansion/).  
As for Vichy, founded in 1983, the data was completed with online data available since 2005. 
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The most expensive violin is a Stradivari “Lady Blunt” sold for $16 M at Tarisio in 2011, 
previously sold in 1971 for $105,000. The oldest violin in the dataset is an Andrea Amati from 
1550. 
            3.2. Data on Repeated Sales 
   The main source for private dealer data are the W. E Hill Business archives licensed 
from David Hill, who inherited the business and records from 1980 until 1991. The main 
auction house data comes from Tarisio Auction House as the maker biography’s and 
provenance information, allowed to track specific violins. It is the belief of the author that the 
dealer sales data are reliable, but of course the prices are the result of self-reporting by dealers 
and buyers. The database has been double checked and completed with the help of the “The 
Red Book” (2012) price guide of authentic stringed instruments and bows, by online auction 
house catalogues and, by private data provided directly from auction houses. 
        The current repeated sales database accounts with 259 violins representing a total of 337 
observations, with some violins being sold more than twice. These are typical high quality 
instruments by top Old Italian makers, including 168 instruments by Stradivari and 33 by del 
Gesù. 
A distinction between violins being sold privately through dealers and those sold publicly 
through auction houses is made in order to explore differences in these markets. So, the 
database has 119 observations where both sale and buy come from auction houses; 124 
observations where both sale and buy are from private dealers; 29 observations where the buy 
is from a dealer but the sale through an auction house; and, 65 observations where the buy is 
from auction house but the sale is through a dealer. Sales where the holding period was less 
than 5 years7 were excluded. This was done for two main reasons: first, in order to focus on 
longer-run returns, and second, several instruments appeared to have been sold twice in the 
same year by the same auction house.  
The minimum time between sales of the same violin in the dataset is 3 years and the 
maximum is 135 years. On average, in the overall dataset, violins were held for 32 years. It is 
to be noted that auction sales are overrepresented in this dataset, as they likely compromise 
only between 10% and 20% of the market. 
 
7 In one of the first studies of returns to art, Baumol (1986) excludes paintings with holding periods of less than 20 yr. 
Goetzmann (1993), by design, excludes paintings with holding periods of less than 10 yr. 
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For regressions, I use prices including buyers’ commissions. Other studies as the Mei 
Moses’s (2002) study on art prices include commissions, and I would like this study to be 
comparable. Sellers’ commissions at auction are negotiable and unknown.  
 
           4. Methodology  
4.1 Hedonic Model 
Each violin is a unique instrument, and the problems incurred in measuring returns to 
violins are similar to the problems incurred when measuring the returns to art, wine, classic 
cars or any other type of passion investment. The result is that there will be some ambiguity in 
the construction of a single index of the movement of prices over time. One concern about 
simply using average prices is that price rises may be exacerbated during booms as “better” 
instruments may come up for sale—which has generally happened with art. In general, average 
prices indicate variability over time in violin prices that is better described as movements in 
the heterogeneity of the quality of the objects offered, rather than movements in prices for the 
same objects.  
The two primary types of indices used for heterogeneous objects are based on regressions 
known as ‘hedonic models’ and ‘repeat sales models’. In hedonic models, differences in items 
are controlled for by including a small number of ‘hedonic’ characteristics. Repeat sales 
models, in effect, include a dummy variable for each item. A repeat sales model is better able 
to control for differences in items across time, but these models usually rely on only a small 
proportion of those items that have come to market.  
Most alternative investment’s auction indices are based on a model where the price of 
the 𝑖𝑡ℎ object sold in time period t is 𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖 + 𝑃𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡, where 𝑃𝑖 is the fixed component of the 
price that reflects the unique and fixed character (or “quality”) of the object. 𝑃𝑡 reflects the 
index of aggregate movements in prices, and the remainder is an idiosyncratic error term. The 
key distinction in the construction of price indices is whether the fixed component is treated as 
determined by a small number of hedonic characteristics, X, that may be controlled by 
regression, or whether it is treated as a parameter that must be controlled explicitly.  
‘Hedonic models’ control for the fixed effect  𝑃𝑖 with the assumption that 𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝑖, 
where  𝑖  is an error term independent of the 𝑃𝑡’s, and estimate 𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝑃𝑡 + 𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 
Alternatively, ‘repeat sale’ models include a dummy variable for each specific object. The great 
attraction of hedonic models is that all the data may be used in the estimation, including data 
on objects that are only offered for sale once in the sample period. The disadvantage of these 
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models is the strong assumption that a (typically small) set of X variables captures much of the 
variability in the fixed components of price (important if the estimates of the time effects are 
to be precise) and that the characteristics of the objects offered do not vary systematically over 
time (important for unbiased estimates of the time effects). Although the repeat sale method 
overcomes the primary disadvantages of the hedonic model, it does so at the cost of discarding 
much data. There must be at least two observations on an instrument’s price or it provides no 
information to help identify the time index. Indeed, depending on the frequency at which repeat 
sales occur, it may not be possible to identify all the time effects in the model. 
Other studies that have calculated price indices for alternative investments include Stein 
(1977), Baumol (1986), Frey and Pommerehne (1989), Buelens and Ginsburgh (1993), 
Pesando (1993), Goetzmann (1993), Barre, Docclo, and Ginsburgh (1996), and Mei and Moses 
(2001). 
In this first general study, the hedonic regression method tis used to construct violin price 
indices. This method is one of two most commonly used techniques to pricing heterogeneous 
assets although it has the disadvantage of being data mining consuming. It requires full 
predictive information from each observation in the final regression.  
In 1966, the theoretical foundation of hedonic regression techniques was firstly 
introduced by Lancaster’s (1996). He argued that it is not only a good itself that creates utility, 
but instead its characteristics. Hedonic regression method breaks down heterogeneous goods 
into price determining characteristics for which no market price stands available since they 
cannot be sold separately. The market conditions of heterogeneous goods implicitly result in 
the marginal contributions of these characteristics to the good’s final price.  
Considering the violin price context for instance, the characteristics may contain 
attributes of the maker’s name, auction location, certificates of authenticity, varnish/color, year 
produced, and other relevant information that exists in and out of the violin. Regression 
techniques can be used to estimate these marginal contributions; thus, for this purpose, 
researchers initially employed hedonic regression in the real estate market.  
Specifically, we assume that the price of violin n in period t, 𝑝𝑛
𝑡 , is a function of k 
characteristics quantified by  𝑥𝑛𝑖





𝑡 , … 𝑥𝑛𝑘
𝑡 , 𝑛




𝑡  is an error term. In order to estimate the marginal contributions of each 𝑥𝑛𝑖
𝑡  by using 














𝑡 are the intercept term and coefficients of parameters for each period t. Given 
the standard error assumption of zero mean and constant variance, it is further assumed that 
the characteristics parameters keep constant over time, at least for short term periods since 
violin market conditions, which determine the characteristics’ marginal contributions, change 
gradually.  
 









𝑡    (1.3) 
 
One of the main strengths for using hedonic regression method is that all observations 
with complete information structure can be included compared to the repeat-sales regression 
method. Therefore, it covers both single and repeat sales data. Of course, this is one side of the 
double-edged sword. Conversely, the disadvantage of hedonic regression remains data 
consuming, as mentioned earlier. It requires each observation in the regression model contains 
full attribute information. Hence, the hedonic approach to constructing the price index for 
heterogeneous goods is to pool all periods data with additional time dummy variables in the 
specification, which generally referred to as the time dummy variable hedonic model as (1.4):  
 
𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑛










𝑡    (1.4) 
 
where 𝐷𝑛
𝜏  is the time dummy variables with value 1 if the observation falls in period τ and 
value 0 if it falls otherwise. The base period time dummy is left out for avoiding multi-
collinearity. The time dummy parameter measures the effect of time on the logarithm price.                   
 
 17 
Taking the exponential of the time dummy coefficients yields quality-adjusted violin 
price change between base period 0 and period t after controlling for the variation in the 
quantities of the characteristics. Therefore, we can construct time dummy price index by 
sequencing price change to base period 0 for each comparison period t, which is  
 
𝑃0𝑡 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛿𝑡)  (1.5) 
 















𝑡)]  (1.6) 
 
where 𝑁(𝑠) is the sample size and 𝑥𝑖𝑠̅̅ ̅ = ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑖
𝑠 𝑁(𝑠)⁄𝑛∈𝑆(𝑠)  is the sample mean of characteristic 
i in period s (s=0, t).  
Equation (1.6) reveals that the ratio of the geometric mean of the price between period 0 
and t is adjusted by the differences in the average characteristics ?̅?𝑖
0𝑖0 and ?̅?𝑖
𝑡  This verifies time 
dummy hedonic method accounts for both changes in the quality mix and quality changes of 
the individual characteristics.  
Given the assumption of constant characteristics parameters over time and the time 
dummy variable hedonic method for constructing violin price index in this paper, the empirical 
model is specified with logarithm of violin auction realized prices as the dependent variable, 
and with a vector of {𝑥𝑛𝑖
𝑡 } indicating all relevant price-determining characteristics as 
independent variables.  
 
In general, we have been following fundamental variables to control for instrument 
quality: instrument age when the violin was auctioned, as a proxy of scarcity; top maker 
dummy for Stradivari and del Gesù violins, as a proxy for maker’s reputation; violin varnish 
dummy as a proxy for acoustic properties of wood and therefore sound quality; authenticity 
dummy followed by certification/label control system as a proxy of originality/non-fake. In 
addition, it has also been included auction related information to control for price realization, 
such as auction house dummy as a proxy of sales institutions’ reputation and bargain power; 
and auction season dummy as a proxy of demand side at specific peaks of the year. 
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Below are the variables used for this regression explained in Table 3. In the Appendix, 
there is a Section explaining in detail each of them. 
Table 3. Variables for regression 
 
TARISIO 1 if the violin was sold at Auction House Tarisio; 0 otherwise 
TOP_AUCTIONHOUSE 1 if the violin was sold at Auction House Sotheby’s or 
Christie’s; 0 otherwise 
AUCTION_SEASON 1 if the violin is sold within the high season (feb-ma, may-
jun, oct-nov); 0 otherwise 
TOP_MAKER 1 if the maker is either Stradivari, del Gesù or, Guarnieri; 
otherwise 0 
STRAD_LOB 1 if it has the standard Stradivari length (between 353-
355mm); 0 otherwise 
INSTRUMENT_AGE 1 if the age of the violin when sold is equal or older than 200 
years; 0 otherwise 
STRAD_VARNISH 1 if the violin has the special deep red colour of Strads; 0 
otherwise 




Consequently, the model (1.4) becomes: 
𝐿𝑛𝑝𝑛














𝑡  (1.7) 
 
4.2 Regression Results 
For the regressions, we use prices including buyers’ commissions. Other studies such as 
the Mei and Moses (2002) study on art prices include commissions, and we would like this 
study to be comparable. Auction houses usually report prices including buyers’ commissions. 
Sellers’ commissions are negotiable and unknown to us. We consider buyer’s commissions 
when interpreting regression results. We estimate the index in US dollars as all purchases, and 
all but a few sales, were recorded in US dollars. 
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In Equation (1.7) the ratio of the geometric mean of the price between period 0 and t is 
adjusted by the differences in the average characteristics. It accounts for both changes in the 
quality mix and changes of the individual characteristics. The logarithm of violin auction 
realized prices is the dependent variable, the vector indicating all relevant price-determining 
characteristics are the independent variables. 
Table 4 shows the Model (1.7) variables’ impact on violins value. To see the price 
relevance of each of the variables, the table includes a column with the “Value Impact” of 
each hedonic variable. “Value impact” of each variable is estimated by taking the exponent of 
the regression coefficient and subtracting 1 (Thornton & Innes, 1989). It is important to 
mention that sometimes, regression coefficients might not indicate causality but 
correlation. The table portrays the parameter estimates of the hedonic variables included in 
model (1.7), except the year dummies, after being regressed on the dependent variable 
LN_2019USDPRICE.  
 It can be observed that the variables Maker and Varnish play an important role on the price 
determination of violins. 
 
Table 4. Regression Results 
Table 4 displays the coefficients and p-values for the independent variables included in the 
model except the year dummies, after regression on the dependent variable ln Price. The price 
impact figure is calculated by taking the exponent of the regression coefficient and subtracting 
1. 
 
Variable Estimate P value Value Impact 
Tarisio 0,616 0,001 85,19% 
Auction Season -0,059 0,650 -5,71% 
Instrument Age 0,513 0,000 67,04% 
Varnish 0,592 0,000 80,75% 
LOB 0,186 0,128 20,47% 
Authenticity 0,252 0,283 28,68% 
Top Auction House 0,588 0,049 45,82% 





5. Addressing market specific limitations 
 
        Since changes in violins’ prices affect the rate of return, some factors determining 
prices are also common to the formation of returns on violins. However, it should be noted 
that the rate of return on violin investment is an outcome of the interplay between many 
different factors that are hard to capture and often unobservable to a layman. I will now 
present some general shortfalls that might lead to difficulties in the estimation of risk-
adjusted returns that are specifically found in the violin market - some are also common to 
the general market for emotional assets; and should be taken cautiously. 
 
5.1 Selection bias 
 
         Stein8 and Goetzman9 point out this matter when estimating the price return over time. 
The data gathered embodies a bias in selection as only includes violins sold though auction 
and in a smaller proportion, violins sold privately through dealers. This upward bias in 
prices of prominent instruments is compensated partly by forced sales such as debt, death 
and divorce which bring ill-timed violins for sale.  
This bias is common in many other fields of heterogeneous goods markets, notably in the 
arts sector, and also in real-estate. 
This causes an issue when constructing indices therefore returns should be adjusted 
downward as result of this upward bias in the volume of returns. The amount of such 
reduction is difficult to estimate as mainly depends on the projection of prevailing taste for 
a specific maker or violin. The same issue is encountered in the estimation for expected 
returns for fine wine, artworks, and of course in equity markets, as well. 
It should be further noted too that due to market specific characteristics, the real 
risks are higher than the ones estimated in the index. Mainly due to the illiquidity nature 
of this market, results in a lowering of the risk-adjusted returns in practice, from a buy-
and-hold strategy in the fine violin sector.  
Also, to be mentioned, another reduction in the average returns comes from the 
significant transaction costs that are involved when buying and selling at auction. 
 
8 Stein, J. P. (1977) ‘The monetary appreciation of paintings’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 85, No. 5, pp. 1021–1035. 




However, in relative terms, the underlying volatility of the violin sector seems to be below 
that of public equities which evolves in a superior Sharpe ratio. I will explore the concerns 
raised around volatility estimates later in the following sections. 
  5.2 Market illiquidity 
 
           A main concern is that, by observing the low volatility in prices over the years, we 
could easily conclude that the risk is low due to the small variation in price. Due to the 
index methodology, prices are smoothed over time as result of transactions occurring at 
longer intervals than the frequency of the index. This means that when the annual averages 
are computed, the data seems to have less volatility than it would, should the violins had 
been sold at auction more frequently. This translates in turn in a higher real risk than the 
one observed.  
The illiquidity risk of this segment arises also because when a violin comes out to 
the market there are only a small number of buyers. This concern is common to other types 
of appraisal-based financial assets such as real estate and hedge funds.  
The lower volatility in the violin market is likely the result of appraisal-induced 
biases, which occur during the indexation of the violin data. The smoothing of the returns 
is a result is this as well. This has the effect of generating volatilities that are substantially 
lower than the true volatility of the market. 
        Because the data for the violin indices are generally appraisal based, the analysis 
needs     to account for this. There exists a difference between the appraisal based returns 
and the true market returns. It is the true market returns that actually represent the economic 
opportunity cost to investors, and the statistical properties of which are directly comparable 
to alternative asset classes. The illiquid nature of the violin market, with frequent 
valuations, and averaged price quotes, leads to a smoothing in the returns. It is therefore 
imperative that the indices are "unsmoothed" to eliminate, as far as possible, any 
underlying autocorrelation, which tends to be characteristic of these smoothed series of 
appraised returns. 
           Therefore, following the prevalent approach of the hedge fund and real state 
segments, used by Okunev and White10 and which has also been chosen by Campbell11 
 
10 Okunev, J. and White, D. (2003) ‘Hedge fund risk factors and value at risk of credit trading strategies’, Working Paper, 
University of New South Wales. 
11 Campbell, R. (2008) ‘Art as an alternative asset class’, Journal of Alternative Investments. 
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when analyzing the fine art segment, I have used the same methodology. 
Although the most widely used approaches are those of Geltner (1993), from the real-estate 
finance literature and now also common in the hedge fund literature (Brooks and Kat 
(2001) and Kat and Lu (2002)). Geltner adjusts the return series to eliminate the first-order 
autocorrelation. 
 
            Assuming that the observed (smoothed) return on the index, rt
∗,  is a weighted 
average of the true underlying return at time t, rt and the observed (smoothed) return at 
time t − 1,  𝑟𝑡−1
∗ ,  
 
𝑟𝑡
∗ = (1 − 𝛼)𝑟𝑡 + 𝛼𝑟𝑡−1
∗  
Simply rearranging enables the determination of the actual return, which, if assumed to be 









           If the first-order autocorrelation of the smoothed series is positive, then the standard 
deviation of the actual return series will be greater. However, if the first-order 
autocorrelation of the smoothed series is negative, then the standard deviation of the actual 
series will be lower.  
             If the autocorrelation structure is more complicated, then the more rigorous 
process developed by Okunev and White (2003) can be adopted to remove higher levels 
of autocorrelation in the smoothed series: 
 
𝛼 =





where the constant a, to unsmooth the series, is a friction of higher orders of 
autocorrelation.  
This approach is directly applicable for violin indices, which also exhibit 
exceptionally high autocorrelations in reported returns. There is indeed evidence of 
smoothing in the returns, and for series that are positively autocorrelated, the smoothing 
has the effect of diminishing the risk apparent in the asset class; hence, it is necessary to 
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correct for the smoothing, resulting in a more volatile unsmoothed return series. 
 Using the more simplified approach of Geltner (1993) does not completely 
eliminate the first-order autocorrelation in the time series for violins. The more 
sophisticated approach from Okunev and White (2003), which takes into account higher 
orders of autocorrelation, does result in an unsmoothed series that no longer suffers from 
first-order autocorrelation. The high positive autocorrelative structure present in the violin 
series results in the unsmoothed series exhibiting significantly higher volatility. Significant 
positive autocorrelation means that the series suffers from appearing less volatile than the 
true data generating process underlying the return structure.  
 Unsmoothing methods have been applied to other types of illiquid funds such as 
private equity, venture capital, and bond mutual funds (Chen, Ferson, and Peters (2010) 
and Ang et al. (2018)), to highly illiquid assets such as collectible violins and art 
investments (Dimson and Spaenjers (2011) and Campbell (2008)), and even to unsmooth 
other economic series such as aggregate consumption (see Kroencke (2017)).  
 
          It is found that unsmoothing the series using the Okunev and White approach leads 
to a considerable increase in the price risk, with volatility rising from 8.61 per cent, which 
seems highly unrealistic, to 19.73 per cent; and, from 17.18 per cent to 28.03 per cent - for 
Violin Index and Strads Index respectively. These values are much more in line with the 
volatility of the other studies. Taking a universal 5% increase in the monthly standard 
deviation for the violin series can show how this increase affects the optimal portfolio 
allocation. It reduces the allocation in violins substantially, by roughly half, from over 20% 
to just over 10%, with the reduction roughly equally spread among the other asset classes 
in the portfolio. The low correlation still results in violins providing an attractive portfolio 
investment. 
 
           Table 5 provides summary statistics on the Violin sector using the Violins Index 
and Stradivari Index. The slightly higher average returns obtained by the Stradivari Violins 
Index is likely to be due to the focus on the high end of the market. It would appear that 
the average returns made in the top end of the market are slightly greater than taking the 
overall market as a whole. The unsmoothing procedure increases the volatility by a 
significant amount, and should capture the true underlying volatility in the market. 
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Av annual return  6.43%  4.97% 3.69%  3.57% 
Av annual St. dev  17.18% 28.03% 8.61% 19.73% 
Av monthly return  0.007 —  0.004 —  
Av monthly St. dev  0.002  —  0.025  —  
Skewness  − 0.654 − 0.271 0.215  0.417  
Kurtosis  1.389 2.081 2.001 2.595 
 
 
For a general view, Figure 1 plots an unsmoothed index on a log scale adjusted for 
inflation since 1880.  
It can be observed that from 1880 to 1960 violin prices were stagnant, between about 
1960 and 1980 there was a sharp rise in prices and that, prices have risen, with some ups 
and downs, since 1980. Therefore, there is a plateau from about 1900 through 1960, when 
it increases sharply until today.  




        In Figure 2, I compare the data for the Violin index of both the original (smoothed) 
index and the unsmoothed one. For comparison reasons, I have rebased the series to 1000 
in 1980.  
I can conclude that the Violin index, after unsmoothing its returns, keeps nevertheless, a 








5.3 Transaction Costs’ Impact 
 
        Another point to mention is the high transaction costs of auction houses in the market 
of violins, where they account for a 20-25% fee, compared to a 5-10% through the private 
dealers. These costs have not been taken into account in any previous analysis, and for an 
accurate portfolio optimization model, these should be reduced from the return. 
         It is also important to note that the longer the time interval between investments, the 
transactions costs will be reduced substantially by the length of the holding period. 
Therefore, depending on whether a dynamic strategy is undertaken or whether a buy-and-
hold strategy is chosen will make a difference in the assumptions taken as to the size of the 
transaction costs. The holding period averages 19 years for top makers and 32 for the rest, 
therefore it can be assumed that the buy-and-hold strategies predominate in this dataset. 
 
A dilemma when comparing the returns on collectibles with those on financial 
securities lies in the differences in transaction costs and average holding periods. The 
transaction costs associated with buying and selling fine violins in auctions, as mentioned, 
amount to approximately 25% on a round-trip. Indeed, one can buy violins at catalogue 
prices through Tarisio while the company indicates a buy-back price of about 75% of 
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premium and seller’s commission, which can add up to more than 20% of the underlying 
item’s value.  
 
Violins experience long holding periods though this must be partly endogenous, since 
high transactions costs presumably curtail trading volume. Considering the long holding 
periods for violins and the short holding periods for equity investment (Barber and Odean, 
2000), the transaction cost drag associated with an investment-quality violin may actually 
be similar to that of an equity portfolio. 
 
To develop after-cost estimates of average returns on violins and equities, I correct 
the baseline nominal geometric mean returns for annualized transactions costs. For violins, 
a transaction cost at sale of 25% is assumed. Custody costs, which are low for violins, are 
ignored. Commissions on buying and selling equities on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
have fluctuated over time, with an average for small transactions of 1.75% and for large 
transactions of 0.45%; in addition, the U.K. levies violin duty on equity purchases, and this 
tax averages 0.92% over the sample interval12. Time series of effective trading spreads are 
not available for Great Britain, so I proxy them with Jones’ (2002) estimates of bid-ask 
spreads for Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) index constituents, which average 
approximately 0.5% for a round-trip. The estimated one-way cost of equity trading is 
therefore the commission plus half the violin duty plus half the spread, namely between 
1.16% and 2.46%, depending on the size of the transaction. I ignore management fees and 
custody costs. The figure below shows the resulting annual post-cost return estimates for 












12  Green, Maggioni, and Murinde (2000) report percentage marginal commission rates for small LSE transactions of 2.50 
(1900–09), 1.25 (1910–17), 2.08 (1918–51), 1.39 (1952–59), 1.25 (1960–75), 1.50 (1976–81), and 1.65 (1982–86), a rate we 
assume persists after the 1986 deregulation. Rates for large transactions are 0.50 (1900–51), 0.75 (1952–59), 1.25 (1960–68), 
0.50 (1969–70), and 0.125 (1971–86), which I also assume persists. The percentage rates of violin duty are 0.5 (1900–46), 2.0 










The figure reveals that, as an historical average, a violin investor needs to hold on to 
his/her violin for more than four years to expect a positive return. As mentioned, data on 
actual holding periods for violins are on average 32 years in the database and 19 for top 
violins. There are sources on holding periods for art and an analysis of all resales within 
Reitlinger (1961) over the period 1760–1960 which yields an average period between 
purchase and sale of 40 years. Despite some reservations about Reitlinger’s data (Guerzoni, 
1995), I regard 40 years as a reasonable estimate of the holding period for lifelong and cross-
generational violin collectors.  With such a holding period, the mean yearly return on top 
violins net of transaction costs is 6.2%. After 25 years and 10 years, the annualized after-
cost returns are 5.8 % and 3.9 %, respectively. A long investment horizon is particularly 
necessary given that violins can also depreciate in real value over many successive years. 
The average holding period for equities is much shorter. If it is assumed an annualized 
turnover that averages 75% of market capitalization, based on Dimson and Marsh and Jones 
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(2002)13, the mean yearly post-cost return for equities equals 5.2% (or 7.3%, if transaction 
costs are small). 
Consistent with Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2009), stock market investors thus lose 
a meaningful proportion of their wealth through trading, and it is clear that before-cost 
returns do not tell the whole story. If the average violin investor retains his violin for a long 
interval, he/she can earn returns that are similar to those of the average equity investor (but 
below those of a buy-and-hold equity investor). 
 
5.4 Other Market Inefficiencies 
 
          The presence of many market inefficiencies in the emotional assets markets, and 
specifically in the musical instrument market leaves room for much higher returns to be 
made than estimated from a sheer buy-and-hold strategy which is captured in the indices. 
A major source of market inefficiency is the presence of asymmetric information in the 
market.  
         This is difficult to assess but should be noted, for instance in the case of indirect 
investments such as violin funds and violin trusts. Here, the capacity of fund managers, 
who have an insight into the market inefficiencies, and who are also able to negotiate lower 
fees when trading fine violins means that the transaction costs incurred are less to a fine 
violin fund than to the direct investor with similar musical instruments. 
 
6. Portfolio Diversification Abilities 
 
          Pursuing to the possibility of an investor diversifying his/her portfolio into the fine 
violin sector, the analysis depends crucially on the estimate for the correlation between 
fine violins prices and other asset class price returns. The lower the correlation coefficient, 
the greater the diversification benefits which can be gained for the investor. Assets 
therefore with quite moderate average returns can therefore have an attraction, and held in 
an optimal portfolio of financial assets, due to their ability to offset variability in the overall 
 
13  Dimson and Marsh (1993–2009) report quarterly equally weighted (EW) and market value-weighted (VW) averages for the 
turnover of British equities. Over 1993–2019, the mean EW average was 74.5% (standard deviation 91.9%), while the mean 
VW average was 89.5% (standard deviation 74.3%). For earlier periods, Jones’ (2002) estimate of DJIA turnover is, on average, 
close to these levels, though with considerable time series fluctuation. 
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portfolio and hence a reduction in risk, and thus the overall expected volatility of the 
overall portfolio.  
        In my analysis, I focus on the violin sector as a means of portfolio diversification 
against a number of alternative financial asset classes. 
        Taking into account the upward bias in the size of the returns, it could be expected a 
lower average return than the one generated previously in other studies.  
         The risks are also higher than captured in other indices, the illiquid nature of the 
market results in a lowering of the risk-adjusted returns in practice from a buy-and-hold 
strategy in the fine violin sector. The unsmoothing procedure increases the volatility by a 
significant amount, and should capture the true underlying volatility in the violin market. 
A further reduction in the average returns occurs from the significant transaction costs that 
are incurred when buying and selling at auction. However, in relative terms, the underlying 
volatility of the violin sector is lower that of public equities resulting at first glance in a 
superior Sharpe ratio. Violin's high transaction costs spread over 39 years equal 1.02% a 
year. Despite these costs, violins still remain an attractive, although small, portfolio 
allocation.           
Table 6 below reports the distribution of nominal and real returns for violins and 
different asset classes over the period 1980–2019. For each asset category, it shows the 
geometric and arithmetic average return (p.a.) and standard deviation (S.D.).  It also shows 
the ex post Sharpe ratios for violins, equities, bonds, art, and gold, taking the returns on 
bills as a proxy for risk-free returns. 
It can be concluded from the SR, that the risk-adjusted return to invest in violins is 


















          In Table 7, I portray the summary statistics for a set of other financial asset classes 
over the period 1980–2019. I have assumed a flat rate 5 per cent point increase in the 
standard deviation of the series to account for the smoothed data.            
    Table 7 Summary Statistics of assets in the Portfolio14 
Returns  
MSCI 
WORLD  GSCI  REITs 
UK 10 
YEAR 







Av Annual Return  76.26 65.29 58.32 64.03 65.81 64.32 49.71 36.9 35.73 
Annual St dev  216.7 302.2 198.3 79.13 85.12 171.8 280.3 86.1 190.73 
Skew  − 1.234  0.024 − 1.071  − 0.120 − 0.716  − 0.654 − 0.276 0.215  0.412 
Kurt  0.805 − 0.052  − 0.904 1.475 3.216 1.389 2.081 2.001 2.595 
Max return  0.369 0.600 0.149  0.0245 0.171 0.982 0.116 1.017 0.172 




14 Equity indices are from Morgan Stanley Capital Indices (MSCI World); Real estate index REITs is retrieved from Datastream. 
UK ten-year Government Bond Index and S&P GSCI data commodity Future data have been downloaded from Goldman Sachs. 
All Art Index and is from Art Market Research.  
 
Nominal Returns Original Unsmoothed Original Unsmoothed Original Unsmoothed
Violins 6.92 6.73 7.6 9.8 20,94 0.196 0.08








Violins 3.69 3.57 4.2 8.61 19.73 0.30 0.125




































 In Table 8, the correlation between these asset classes in the previous 39 years is 
shown. The correlation between violins and other financial asset classes is significantly 
low. Also, the correlation is low with the art market (although positive). It appears that 
these markets are independent from each other, with different factors driving demand and 
hence prices in these markets. It can be observed, as expected, that after unsmoothing the 
correlations become less drastic, as now the volatilities of violin indices have risen to more 
in line levels and the returns have been adjusted. After unsmoothing it can be found that 
violins are negatively correlated to bonds and real state and positively correlated to 
commodities and art. This result has hinted at the existence of a wealth effect.  
 
      Table 8. Correlations between different asset classes 
  
MSCI 
WORLD  GSCI  REITs 
UK 10 
YEAR 









MSCI WORLD  1000 
     
   
GSCI Commodity  0.004  1000 
    
   
REITs 0.580  0.256 1000 
   
   
UK 10 YEAR GOVT  0.133  − 0.056  0.306  1000 
  
   
ART  − 0.231  0.249 − 0.041 − 0.354 1000 
 
   
Strad original 0,143 − 0.306 − 0.287 − 0.386 0.011 1000    
Strad unsmooth  0.029  0.024  − 0.115  − 0.077  0.008 0.987 1000   
Violin original 0.013 − 0.017 − 0.023 − 0.057 0.004 0.2034 0.996 1000 
 
Violin unsmooth − 0.019  0.016 0.001 − 0.008 0.002  0.1997 0.2033 0.998 1000 
 
 
6.1. Violin’s sensibility to the equity market  
  The lack of correlation between violin and equity returns in Table 8 may be due to 
the non- simultaneous nature of the two types of returns. This issue arises from three different 
sources. First, violin prices probably adjust slowly to changes in financial-economic 
conditions. Second, catalogue prices partially reflect prior periods’ pricing history. Third, in 
order to calculate yearly violin returns, I allocate all published catalogues to the closest year-
end. This gives rise to a minor disparity between the reported price trends of violins and the 
timing of equity returns.  
  To further understand the true relationship between equity market and violins, I 
therefore estimate the market model beta using the aggregated coefficients methodology of 
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Dimson (1979), which accounts for non-simultaneousity in asset returns. Dimson (1979) first 
runs a regression of asset returns on lagged, matching, and leading market returns:  




𝑚 + 𝜐𝑡 
where a is the number of lagged market returns, and b indicates the number of leading market 
returns. The slope coefficients are then aggregated to get an unbiased estimate of the beta of 
an asset:  




The results for the series of violin and equity returns are shown in the Table below. 
Model 1 portrays the traditional beta which is very close to zero. In model 2, when also 
including one lag and one lead in the analysis a significantly positive beta of 0.223 is observed, 
with a β−1 equal to 0.142, indicating that it is mainly lagged equity market movements that 
matter. In model 3, this beta grows to 0.326 with two lags and one lead. 
     These results show that there is non-insignificant positive correlation between equity returns 
and violins returns, but that the systematic risk of violins is still relatively low. The low beta 
of violins is consistent with the finding that the financial crisis did not stop violin prices from 
rising. 
This result has evidenced at the existence of a wealth effect: there is a positive correlation 







 Table 9. Results from aggregated coefficients method15 
 
        The table 9 reports the results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of Eq. (1), 
which relates violin returns to equity market returns over the period 1980–2019.  
 
6.2. Inflation Hedging Abilities 
 
In this section I explore the hedge that violins present against expected and unanticipated 
inflation. 
Violins are found to have a positive correlation between nominal violin returns and 
inflation, but a negative correlation between real violins returns and inflation. This last result 
is surprising as there was a great surge in violin demand in the late 70’s when inflation levels 
where high. 
I will follow similar studies in real estate, such as Liu, Hartzell, and Hoesli (1997) that 
in order to initiate the analysis, they take a proxy for expected inflation that is available over 
the very long term. First, I will include lagged short-term interest rates in the analysis.  
Fama (1975) shows that if the T-bill market is efficient, and if the expected real return 
on bills does not change, changes in the nominal interest rate should be due to changes in the 
expected rate of inflation. I will use Global Financial Data yields on one-year government 
notes.  
 
15 β aggregates the individual slope coefficients on a lagged market returns, the same-year market return, and b leading market 
returns into an unbiased estimate of the market model beta, using Dimson (1979). R2 is the R-squared, or the multiple 
correlation coefficient. ***, **, and * denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All 
coefficients are significantly smaller than one.)  
 
β-2 β-1 β0 β+1 β R2 
Model 1 (a = 0 and b = 0) 0.002 0.002 0.000
Model 2 (a=1 and b =1) 0.142 ** 0.043 0.039 0.223 ** 0.057
Model 3 (a = 2 and b = 1) 0.080 0.149 ** 0.053 0.047 0.326 ** 0.075
 34 
Following Fama and Schwert (1977), I will test the effectiveness of this proxy as 
predictors of inflation through the following model: 
∆𝑡= 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐸(Δ𝑡) + ℇ𝑡 
where ∆t is the true inflation rate, measured at the end of year t.  
If β is close to unity (and α is close to zero), the expected inflation will be correctly 
accounted for. The error term reflects the unexpected component of the observed inflation. 
Table 1116 shows the result of the OLS estimation of the above Equation which compares 
inflation rate to ex ante prediction of inflation over the period of time. α is the intercept and β 
is the slope coefficient. The null hypothesis is that the proxy for expected inflation in the first 
column is an effective one.  
Table 11 Validity of Inflation predictors 
 
The α is statistically alike from zero, while β is only significantly different from one at 
the 10% level. I also use lagged inflation as a measure of expected inflation, as a robustness 
check. Although β is significantly smaller than unity for this proxy, a higher R-squared in the 
estimation of the inflation Equation is observed.  
Once proven that short-term interest rates are a reasonably good proxy for inflation, the 
next step is to test whether violins are a hedge against expected and unexpected inflation using 
the methodology of Fama and Schwert (1977).  
Their model is the following:  
𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝐸(Δ𝑡) + 𝛾𝑗[Δ𝑡 − 𝐸(Δ𝑡)] + 𝜂𝑗𝑡 
 
16 Data on short-term interest rates comes from Global Financial Data. Inflation data comes from Dimson, Marsh, and 
Staunton (2009).  
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where Rjt is the nominal rate of return on asset j, E(Δt) is the expected inflation rate 
and Δt − E(Δt) is the unanticipated inflation rate.  
Violins are a hedge against anticipated inflation if βj is equal to one, while they are a 
hedge against unexpected inflation if γj is equal to one. The estimation results from the 
Equation above, using short-term interest rates and past inflation as proxies for expected 
inflation are shown in Table 12. 
Table 12 Inflation Hedging potential of violins versus other assets 
 
Table 12 portrays the results of the OLS estimation of the Equation above that tests 
whether assets hedge against expected and unexpected inflation, over the dataset period. 
The table shows the results for two proxies of expected inflation: short-term interest rates 
and lagged inflation. In each case, the null hypothesis is that of a good hedge.  
To further analyze the relation between unanticipated inflation and the returns in 
violins, the analysis performed for violins using the aggregated coefficients methodology of 
Dimson (1979). In second this case, γ is estimated by aggregating the slope coefficients on 
one lagged term, the same-year unanticipated inflation, and one leading term. The nominal 
violin return data are shown in Table 1217.  
 
17 Data on short-term interest rates come from Global Financial Data. The return data for equities, bonds, bills, and inflation 
come from Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2009). The return data for art come from Goetzmann, Renneboog, and Spaenjers 
(2010) and Artprice.com (2010). Gold prices are downloaded from Global Financial Data.  
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It can be seen that violins, gold and equities hedge good against expected inflation, 
independently of the proxy used for inflationary expectations. If dealers condition their price 
adjustments on realized inflation in the previous period, violins will partially hedge against 
expected inflation by construction, especially when past inflation is used as a proxy for 
inflationary expectations  
When turning to unanticipated inflation, only gold seems to maintain a consistent 
hedging ability. Non-synchroneity is a milder problem when exploring expected inflation 
and returns because expected inflation rate is persistent over time, according to Fama and 
Schwert (1977). I repeat the Fama-Schwert tests using Dimson’s aggregated coefficients 
methodology to find the true sensitivity of violin returns to unexpected inflation. By 
including one leading and one lagged term, coefficients on γ are not significantly smaller 
than one at the 10% level which indicates that violins only partially hedge against 
unanticipated inflation. 
6.3. Optimal Portfolio Allocation 
       Markowitz (1952) pioneered the modern investment theory with his classic mean-
variance efficient frontier model. He states that the better way to reduce risk is to diversify 
the portfolio. The Figure 4 below shows the improvements of Top Violins after 
unsmoothing, to base portfolio mix. It can be seen from this figure that the inclusion of 
Violins provides a significant diversification benefit to base portfolio mix by pushing 
efficient frontier upward noticeably. The yellow star stands for the optimal portfolio after 
violin’s inclusion and the black star depicts the base portfolios.  
 





           It is important to highlight that once again the outcome of the optimal portfolio 
model is specific to the input and thus to the historical returns made for the chosen asset 
classes over this period. If financial returns are used to estimate future returns, then the 
model could be used for an optimal portfolio strategy; however, future returns are by 
definition unknown, and thus the model only provides to the investor an idea of a 
diversified portfolio strategy and does not guarantee any future performance.                
         The outcome of the optimal portfolio strategy is given in Table 13. It can be seen that 
no allocation is given to equities, which given the recent poor performance and the 
relatively high volatility is not surprising. Corporate bonds have done well in the past years, 
and hence the model results in a large allocation into this asset which has achieved high 
annual returns.  
         As expected, the model allocates a 21 and a 14 per cent allocation into violins before 
and after unsmoothing, respectively, because the rise in volatility after the unsmoothing 
procedure. Interestingly, the improvement in the portfolio of 12% after including violins 
in the unsmoothing model surpasses the 9% improvement of the smoothing (original) 
model. Therefore, it can be sustained and even emphasized, that by tackling the issues 
posed by this niche market, violin’s inclusion in a portfolio continues to show a positive 
addition, at least from an empirical point of view. 
 




original Strad uns Violin  Uns.
MSCI WORLD 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
ART 0,0697 0,0419 0,0805 0,0956
REITs 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
UK 10 YEAR 
GOVT 0,7018 0,6387 0,6380 0,6667
GSCI Commodity 0,2285 0,1020 0,1398 0,2379
Strad original - 0,2174 - -
Strad uns - - 0,1416 -
Violins uns - - - 0,0033
Return 0,0637 0,0621 0,0632 0,0622
Risk 0,0633 0,0557 0,0556 0,0595
Sharpe Ratio 0,6434 0,7020 0,7238 0,6525
Improvement 9% 12% 1%
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A. Study 1: Analyzing the ‘work-of-art effect’ in the fine stringed instrument market 
Within the empirical research focusing in the returns from alternative investments, an 
interesting phenomenon has been observed: the ‘masterpiece’ or ‘work-of-art’ effect. 
Intuitively, if art works are indeed believed to be “masterpieces”— works of exceptional 
quality or renown—then, we might expect the returns from investing in these art works to 
uniformly outperform the general sample and market. However, James Pesando, Jianping Mei 
& Michael Moses and, Ashenfelter & Graddy - among others - have found that masterpieces 
tend to underperform the market and, in fact, provide lower cumulative returns than non-
masterpieces.  
The market of stringed instruments, like the one for art and other passion investments, is 
very heterogeneous. The market has a large variety of pieces, from truly outstanding works of 
art to regular items. This study aims to analyze the ‘work-of-art effect’ within the violin market 
– this is, to analyze whether it is more interesting to invest in one single violin rather than in a 
variety of lower quality violins with an equal overall value (Mei Moses, 2002). In order to do 
this, the repeat-sales regression method will be used to test a sample of 259 violins. 
A.1. Previous Literature on the ‘Work-of-Art effect’ 
Ashenfelter and Graddy (2003) explain the work of art in the following way “It is always 
better (in terms of returns realized ex-post) to buy an item at USD 10.000 than to buy 10 items 
at USD 1.000.”  
Most of the recent research on the ‘masterpiece effect’ was triggered by Pesando (1993), 
although it was John Ruskin who wrote in his 1857 book ‘A Joy for Ever (And Its Price in the 
Market)’ that “in the long run, the dearest pictures are the best bargains”.  
The conventional wisdom of art investing is to buy the most noted works in order to 
obtain the highest returns, though according to more rigorous empirical testing, masterpieces 
often underperform the art index. Previous studies in the literature provide mixed empirical 
findings in various markets on this topic. The datasets of both the Mei and Moses (2002) and 
Pesando (1993) suggest that buying highly prized and valuable paintings or prints is a poor 
investment strategy. This observation is particularly poignant in light of the fact that it is 
precisely these rare masterpieces that ought to yield the highest conspicuous consumption boon 
to utility. 
Mei and Moses (2002) defined a masterpiece portfolio as the top one-third of paintings 
by price, and reported that masterpieces tend to have lower excess returns than non-
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masterpieces, and that systematic risk does not explain the ‘masterpiece effect’. Their evidence 
is consistent with the view that investors overpay for masterpieces under the influence of 
auctioneer estimates. Graddy and Ashenfelter (2002) found that “masterpieces” 
underperformed in the Contemporary Art sample, but have no effect in the Impressionist Art 
sample, consistent with Pesando (1993) and Mei and Moses (2002) in Contemporary Art. De 
la Barre, Docclo, and Ginsburgh (1994) find that great Impressionists return 4 percent higher 
than other Impressionists, though Ashenfelter and Graddy (2003) find no ‘masterpiece effect’ 
for Impressionist art and a return of 50 percent less for contemporary masterpieces. Pesando 
and Shum (2008) reexamined the ‘masterpiece effect’ in the modern print market from 
1977~2004, but found mixed results. A more recent working paper by Kräussl and 
NasserEddine (2017) sees evidence supporting the ‘masterpiece effect’ – real annual returns 
on masterpieces, defined by the top 5% priced artworks, over different time horizons are 
significantly high. 
An explanation for the underperformance of masterpieces is posited by Mei and Moses 
(2005): auction houses tend to upwardly bias price estimates for high-priced works which 
correlates with subsequently poor investment returns. That credulous investors systematically 
overpay due to the influence of auction house price estimates seems consistent with a story in 
which (rational) investors receive nonpecuniary benefits from high-priced art purchases. Also, 
note that expected returns on masterpieces should in theory be lower if agents derive utility 
from conspicuous consumption (Mandel, 2008) 
Another explanation for the ‘masterpiece effect’ to be negative is due to overbidding 
followed by mean reversion. Thus, masterpieces outperform in one period—we could theorize 
the one in which their “masterpiece” status was originated or consolidated—and then 
underperform once they’re more established and change hands less frequently (presumably, 
these pieces would be coveted and thus not traded as often). 
Also, masterpieces are less risky because they’re more liquid—they may not trade as 
often, but are definitely easy enough to sell in the market when they do enter it. It is elementary 
intuition in financial economics that lower risk involves lower returns. To that extent, non-
masterpieces would provide higher returns because they’re indeed riskier than established 
pieces. For these riskier assets, you can buy at a low price and sell at a much higher price later 
given changing tastes. 
Given the above discussion, the ‘masterpiece effect’ almost becomes a market efficiency 
question, in that masterpieces could be considered assets that trade “efficiently”, while non-
masterpieces may not. Applying the concept of an efficient security to an artwork, because of 
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their very status as masterpieces, we can presume all possibly available information is known 
about these works and their artists/makers, so no new information (despite, perhaps, 
deterioration of the work itself or discovery as a fake, etc.) should ever come out about that 
item. Thus, because prices for an asset that trades efficiently should only adjust to new, 
material, and public information, we should expect prices for masterpieces to change very little 
over time and thus, these works to provide very low (if not zero) returns. Because we may lack 
much more information on non-masterpieces, and because there is a higher likelihood that 
some particular investors or participants in the market receive more or better information on 
them than others, non-masterpieces may thus show inaccurate prices and allow for outsized 
returns that deviate from their true value, as compared to masterpieces.  
Ashenfelter and Graddy summarize James Pesando’s discussion of the market efficiency 
question: when pieces trade efficiently, “the market should internalize the favorable properties 
of masterpieces into their prices, so that risk-adjusted returns should not exceed that of other 
pieces.” Of course, here Pesando explains the ‘masterpiece effect’ without relying on the 
inefficiency of non-masterpieces. In fact, for Pesando, it is because the market is efficient for 
both masterpieces and non-masterpieces that the former do not demonstrate higher returns than 
the latter (for non-masterpieces, there's simply newer information about them coming to the 
market, so there is more positive price adjustment for newer, non-established works as opposed 
to masterpieces).  
          Of course, this entire discussion relies on some critical questions: firstly, empirical 
research into this topic requires us to appropriately control for survivorship bias. After all, as 
mentioned above, masterpieces are presumably much more liquid than non-masterpieces. As 
such, they are likely to sell much more often so that, when we consider all the non-masterpieces 
that don’t “survive” in the art market, the cumulative returns of these non-masterpieces may 
ultimately be below that of the more reliable masterpieces, making the latter ultimately still the 
better investment. We should also point out that the results of any models will ultimately rely 
on what works are defined as masterpieces. Much of the research suffers from the fact that 
masterpieces are identified endogenously, based on prices, which makes a negative 
‘masterpiece effect’ hard to discern from simple mean reversion in prices. There is thus a need 
for studies in which masterpieces are identified by means of another criterion than price, as 
also pointed out by Ashenfelter and Graddy (2006). We will further explore this issue of 
interest. Lastly, it is difficult to prove whether a piece or certain sectors of the market trade in 
an efficient way. As well as to explain why do prices change so dramatically for artworks - 
Other than inflation, why would a Stradivari 50 years from now sell at a much higher price 
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than today. The most obvious answer would simply be changing consumer preferences: 
perhaps 50 years from now, Stradivari violins are even more popular than today. Yet, how do 
we calculate when the popularity of an artist changes and how do we define that popularity to 
then measure and apply to the art market equivalent of an event study. 
Generally speaking, masterpieces are thought to provide more liquidity and low risk in 
terms of price fluctuations or maybe even promise value appreciation. The aim is to explore 
the ‘masterpiece effect’ in the violin market and to see whether high net wealthy individuals 
should start to seek such masterpieces as a store of value. 
 
A.2. Data and Repeated Sales Returns 
 
The repeated sale database described under Section 3.2 has been used for this targeted study. 
Given that every violin is unique, it is difficult to measure the return obtained after 
investing on a specific violin. This makes it difficult to construct a unique index representing 
the movement of prices through time. Given this singularity, the two models described 
previously have been developed to calculate the returns: the hedonic regression and the repeat-
sales methods. As a quick reminder, through the former, some characteristics of a violin are 
decomposed and given separate values. Thus, it allows to compare heterogeneous assets of the 
same class. The key benefit of this approach is that it enables the inclusion of large datasets in 
the analysis, whereas the main disadvantage is its limitations to the model specifications. The 
repeated-sales regression, on the other hand, is superior to the hedonic price models in that it 
controls for all characteristics of an artwork as the prices of the same assets are tracked 
overtime. Its main disadvantage is that the resulting figures are based on a subset of only those 
assets that were repeatedly sold. That is, it omits the larger proportion of available data. 
Throughout various research, academics have relied on the repeat sales regression framework. 
This last model will be used to analyze the ‘masterpiece effect’ in the violin market. 





) = ∑ 𝛽𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
 
Where 𝛽𝑡 is the average return of the violins included in the dataset for the period t; 𝛿𝑡 
an indicator for each period (the coefficient of this variable is proportional to the holding period 
during the observed timeline); 𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
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The observations consist of prices of buys and prices of sales, 𝑃𝐼𝐵 and 𝑃𝐼𝑆, for each violin 
as well as the dates corresponding to these prices. I is the index for each instrument, B 
represents a buy and S a represents sale.  
As the number of observations is low, we calculate the returns in periods of 10 years as 
Goetzmann (1993). The estimated coefficients for each period for the repeat sales model are 
presented in the following Table A-1.  
 
The annual returns as well as the index for each period; (1 + 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡)
10 ∗
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡−1,  are presented in Table A- 1 as well. 
The average index itself equals the 𝑇𝑡ℎ root of the index in period T divided by the index 











Table A- 1 Calculation of annual return and Index for each period 
  Beta Annual return Index 
Period 1 0,2 0,02 1,22 
Period 2 0,25 0,03 1,56 
Period 3 0,76 0,08 3,35 
Period 4 0,31 0,03 4,58 
Period 5 0,64 0,07 8,72 
Period 6 0,14 0,01 10,07 
Period 7 0,6 0,06 18,41 
Period 8 1,12 0,12 56,24 
Period 9 -0,25 -0,02 43,76 
Period 10 -0,08 -0,01 40,48 
Period 11 0,73 0,08 84,17 
Period 12 1 0,11 229,18 
Period 13 1,71 0,19 1271,63 
Period 14 1,33 0,14 4806,3 
Period 15 0,44 0,05 7473,47 











Turning to our targeted study we construct two portfolios, one solely for masterpieces 
(defined by the 20% top prices in our sample database) and the other one, for the rest of the 
instruments. In order to analyze whether there exists a difference between the returns of the 
two portfolios, the hypothesis that the return function for the masterpieces has a coefficient  𝛽0
′  
greater than other violins is made.  





) =  𝛽0













 d is the difference between the coefficients:  
𝑑 =  𝛽0
′ − 𝛽0. 
 
From here, the two return functions can be combined by defining one variable indicator 
M that takes the value of 1 for the 20% top priced items and the value of 0 for the rest. The 











By doing this, it will allow us to see the significance of the coefficient of the variable M 
by doing a Student test. The null hypothesis is 𝐻0: 𝑑 = 0; this is, the ‘work-of-art effect’ 





As we can see from Table A- 2, the coefficient of the variable M in the second model is 
estimated at 0.31 and is significant at the 5% limit (see Model 2, Table A- 2). The coefficient 
is therefore different than 0 and positive. We observe that “masterpiece” violins have a higher 
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return that the rest. This result is different to the one in the general literature for alternative 
investments. 
We see here that the fact of selling a violin through an auction house versus selling it 
privately through a dealer could influence strongly on its price. It would be interesting then to 
explore this further. In the next section, we will examine the ‘masterpiece effect’ in either case. 
 
Table A- 2 Regression Results 
 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Period 1     0,84*  
Period 2       
Period 3 0,76*** 0,75*** 0,66*** 1,25** 0,53** 0,73*** 
Period 4     0,45**  
Period 5 0,64** 0,66*** 0,60**  0,70*** 0,70*** 
Period 6       
Period 7 0,60** 0,609*** 0,61*** 0,81** 0,52* 0,61*** 
Period 8 1,11*** 1,12*** 1,08*** 0,93** 1,23*** 1,11*** 
Period 9   -0,36* -1,04**   
Period 10    0,88*   
Period 11 0,73*** 0,69*** 0,69***  0,66** 0,65*** 
Period 12 1,00*** 1,00*** 1,07*** 0,87*** 1,07*** 0,99*** 
Period 13 1,71*** 1,63*** 1,78*** 1,82*** 1,03*** 1,74*** 
Period 14 1,33*** 1,25*** 1,39*** 1,30*** 1,58*** 1,36*** 
Period 15 0,44*** 0,40*** 0,50*** 0,39***  0,50*** 
Period 16       0,35*     
Constant   -0,31*** -0,22**  -0,21*** 
M  0,31***  0,055 1,02***  
D   0,46***    
Maker           0,29*** 
No Obsv. 337 337 337 184 153 337 
Adj. R^2 0,89 0,89 0,90 0,90 0,91 0,89 
 
Model 1: Regression for overall database 
Model 2: Test of ‘work-of-art effect’ 
Model 3: Test of dealers vs. auction houses 
Model 4: Test of ‘work-of-art effect’ on violins sold through auction houses 
Model 5: Test of ‘work-of-art effect’ on violins sold through dealers 
Model 6: Test of ‘work-of-art effect’ by maker 





A.4.1. Dealers vs. Auction Houses 
 
We are going to examine, first of all, the need of calculating the ‘work-of-art effect’ in 
each of the two sub-samples in the database. Indeed, if there is no difference in the returns of 
each sub-sample, the ‘work-of-art effect’ will not be different when differentiating public 
versus private sales. 
We have seen in previous violin literature, that the top priced violins are sold through 
private dealers. We therefore make the hypothesis that the returns from violins sold via private 
dealers have a coefficient 𝛽0
′  higher than the coefficient of those violins sold through auction 
houses. We use the same formulas that the ones to calculate the ‘work-of-art effect’ but these 
time, we define a variable D that takes the value 1 if the violin is sold through private dealers 










This will allow us to verify whether the variable D is significant by doing a Student test.  
The null hypothesis is 𝐻0: 𝑑 = 0; this is that violins sold via private dealers do not have 
a return significantly different to those sold via auction houses. The alternative hypothesis is 
𝐻1: 𝑑 ≠ 0; this is that the sales done through private dealers have a different return than the 
sales done via auction houses.  
We expect the returns coming from private dealers to be higher. 
We can observe from the results in Model 3 (see Model 3, Table A- 2) that the coefficient 
of the variable D is significantly higher that 0 and positive, as the coefficient is 0,46. Therefore, 
we can conclude, that there is a difference in the returns coming from violins sold via auction 
houses and those being sold via private dealers.  
We will proceed then by calculating the ‘work-of-art effect’ for each sub-sample. 
However, we should note that the data contains only 337 observations and that by splitting the 
sample we will obtain two smaller sub-samples that would need to be analyzed carefully as the 
small sample in this database may not be a representation of the wider population. 
 
A.4.1.1 Sub-sample of violins sold through Auction Houses 
  
This sub-sample consists of 184 observations. The average return for the period 1850-
2009 is 5,79%. 
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The methodology used to calculate the ‘work-of-art effect’ is the same we have been 
using above. We therefore verify whether the coefficient of the indicative variable M is 
significant by doing a Student test. The null hypothesis is 𝐻0: 𝑑 = 0 and, the alternative 
𝐻1: 𝑑 ≠ 0. 
We observe this time that the coefficient of the variable M is not significantly different 
from 0 (see Model 4, Table A- 2) because the probability of the coefficient being higher to the 
statistic of Student is only 0,055. Therefore, no ‘work-of-art effect’ is seen in the case of violins 
sold through auction houses.  
As noted above this result has to be taken into consideration with caution as it could have 
a representativeness bias. 
 
A.4.1.2 Sub-sample of violins sold through Private Dealers 
   
This sub-sample consists of 153 observations. The average return for the period 1850-
2009 is 6,16%. 
The methodology used to calculate the ‘work-of-art effect’ is the same that the one we 
used above. We therefore verify whether the coefficient of the indicative variable M is 
significant by doing a Student test. The null hypothesis is 𝐻0: 𝑑 = 0 and, the alternative 
𝐻1: 𝑑 ≠ 0. 
This time, we observe the coefficient of variable M being significantly different from 0 
and positive (see Model 5, Table A- 2). A positive ‘work-of-art effect’ for the violins sold via 
private dealers is observed.  
We should note the same remark as above, regarding the representative bias. 
 
 
A.4.2. Masterpiece Definition 
 
Different criteria can be made when selecting how to define masterpieces. Barre (1996) does not 
use top prices as a way to define masterpieces as the majority of authors, he uses instead 
maker’s reputation. Therefore, the next logical step is to test whether the ‘work-of-art effect’ 
is different when we define a masterpiece by the extent of reputation of the luthier making the 
item rather than by the top priced items. We will consider the makers Stradivari and del Gesù 
as the ones with higher reputation. We have therefore created an indicative variable Maker 
which takes the value of 1 if the violin has been created by either Stradivari or del Gesù and, 0 
if not.  
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We will observe 201 violins created by Stradivari and del Gesso that represent about 60% 
of the dataset. We can determine whether Stradivari and del Gesù violins have a higher return 
thanks to a Student test. The null hypothesis is Ho: d = 0 and the alternative H1: d  0.  
We can see from the results in Model 6 (see Model 6, Table A- 2) that the coefficient of 
the variable Maker is significantly different to 0 and positive, as the coefficient is 0,29. We can 
therefore conclude that the violins made by Stradivari and del Gesù have higher returns than 
the rest. 
 
In this study, the existence of a positive ‘masterpiece effect’ in the market for violins has 
been demonstrated, regardless whether they are defined as the 20% higher priced or by top 
luthier (proxy for best market quality). Further it has been proven that violins sold through 
private dealers experience higher returns than the ones sold through public auction houses and, 
through this result it has been proven the existence of a market differentiation from violins in 
both channels. In addition, it has been confirmed that the masterpiece effect is most prominent 
























This study, explores the price determinants of violin investment with a particular 
focus on the impact of the so-called musician-effect. Although natural endowments remain 
essential for determining the quality of an instrument, auction-wise attributes as well as 
musician-effect are crucial price determinants for goods that can be experienced. It is a 
particularity of this niche market that the final owner is most of times a different person than 
the musician playing the instrument. Musical instruments, specially, fine old stringed 
instruments need to be played in order to keep its acoustic properties and, therefore maintain 
its value. This triangle violin-musician-owner exists in every violin investment and translates 
in an important factor determining the price of these instruments. This fact motivated me to 
further isolate this particular musician-effect and to try to account for its real weight in this 
asset class. 
With the previous transactional data from leading violin auction houses and 
historical records of musician renting the individual instruments, I analyze the impact that a re-
known musician has on the prices of the violin it plays. Talented musicians are expected to be 
able to appreciate violin acoustic properties (which translates into higher quality), particularly 
for less famous instruments. This argument will be tested for the first time. 
Moreover, event study methodology will be applied to further analyze the musician-
effect. The evolution of a musician playing a violin towards a pared similar instrument played 
by various musicians or none will be treated as an event of interest. This evidence hints at an 
innovative approach to isolate the real musician-effect from other price determinant variables 
and to study the dynamics that playing a violin by a talented musician has on prices.  
 
B.2 Data 
The table below provides the descriptive statistics of the violin database over the 
past 39 years from 1980 to 2019. Panel A divides violins by musician reputation, past 
provenance and sample period. Musician reputation has been defined by using a score system 
which grades musician’s level of expertise. Starting from base point 50, the system is divided 
by three scales: 50-79 talented musician, 80-95 rising talent, 96-100 established musician. Past 
provenance is defined by number of previous notorious owners. Table B -1 Panel A shows the 
descriptive statistics of the dataset. It is observed from that the distribution of violins played 
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by musicians is highly skewed towards top maker violins. This selection bias is not surprising 
since talented musicians are not usually exposed to low-quality violins.  
 
Table B -1 Panel B demonstrates 2334 violin sales included in the event study 
analysis, the database is controlled for a minimum trading frequency of 2. Trading frequency 
ranges from 6 times to 2 times. Finally, 53 violin pairs are included in the sample set.  
Among these violin pairs, some violins undergo up to 4 times re-valuations, and 
others encounter fewer. Re-valuation is defined as changing hands from one musician to 
another which translates into a change in the rating of that particular instrument. The respective 
distribution is also shown in Table B-1 Panel B. Re-valuations are defined as number of re-
known musicians renting/playing the instrument in the 39-year span of the database. 
 
Table B -1 Database Summary Statistics 
             
Panel A. (451 sales) Hammer price ($)  
    Mean  St. Dev.  Obs.  Pct.    
Musician Reputation  
50-79  368.77  87.09  49 1.10%    
80-95  457.42  214.52  114 19.51%    
96-100  510.16  403.55  288 44.19%    
              
  1-3 282.61  570.34  116 23.15%    
  4-6 384.98  651.68  272 60.22%    
Provenance >6 759.03  1098.59  63 10.38%    
  
80-90  
          
  118.65  229.13  43 11.65%    
  91-00  169.06  284.72  79 22.74%    
Sample Period  01-10  279.54  454.62  112 31.10%    
  11-19  720.93  988.91  217 34.51%    
              
Panel B. re-valuated violins (2334 sales)         
  Mean  Min.  Max.  St. Dev.  # violins Obs.  
# of Frequency  2.4 2 6 548  53 
2334 
  
Re-valuated times  4 times  3 times  2 times  1 times  Sum    






B.3. Methodology  
B.3.1. Hedonic Regression approach  
In order to explore the price determinants of violins in this section, I apply the same 
hedonic regression method as before. The only difference is that one subjective variable is 
incorporated - talented musician -  to the model specification. This new subjective price 
determinant is considered as a mixed proxy of underlying overall quality and consumer appeal. 
Therefore, the model becomes:  
 
𝐿𝑛𝑝𝑛
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B.3.2 Event Study 
In this study, I apply event study methodology to the violin auction market. During a 
musician’s career, he/she rents a violin not only once but several times at different time life 
periods, and this fact affects the violin’s interest for collectors and amateurs as indicates 
changes in instrument’s quality and therefore acts as a rating signal. When a musician rents a 
new instrument, this translated to the market as a re-valuation of the violin it leaves and of the 
new one he/she will play. Given this niche markets’ specific influence on violin 
buyers/collectors/investors and the general rationality in the violin market, the effect of a new 
musician playing an instrument impacts prices immediately when a re-valuation occurs.  
The abnormal return of violin i at renting change date t is defined as the difference 
between the realized return and the expected return given the absence of such event:  
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑖,𝑡] 
 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the actual return based on auction hammer price, Ω𝑖,𝑡 is the information set given 
no revaluation change and 𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑖,𝑡] is the expected/predicted return given no change in 
revaluation. The cumulative abnormal return for asset i during time (𝑡1,𝑡2) is the addition of 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡which is:  
 





A substantial feature of an event study is the choice of an appropriate prediction model 
to estimate the pricing parameters. The most common models for event study in the financial 
 51 
market are the constant mean return model and the market model. The hedonic regression 
model aforementioned as nonparametric model (local linear regression) is applied to estimate 
parameters of price factors as well as to solve the unbalanced transaction interval issue, which 
is common to all alternative assets. Because the violin auction market is not a scheduled trading 
market as regular as the stock market, different auction houses follow their own time schedules 
and categories for the transaction frequency for different violins and therefore sample periods 
vary.  
The corresponding hedonic regression model for each violin used in the study is the 
following: 
ln 𝑝𝑛
𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ln (𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑛
𝑡 + 𝛽2Loc𝑛
𝑡 + 𝛽3LOB𝑛
𝑡 + 𝛽4ln (𝑄𝑡𝑦)𝑛
𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
 
With the parameter estimations, the abnormal returns are estimated and necessary tests 
are implemented. Under the null hypothesis, 𝐻0, the event fails to influence the behavior of 
returns, the statistical properties of the abnormal returns can be used to draw conclusions over 





and the respective cumulative abnormal return is:  
 






Assuming no overlap in the event windows, the abnormal returns and the cumulative 
abnormal returns remain independent across the assets included.  
 









and, the sample aggregated abnormal return for period t is:  
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The statistical test of abnormal returns is based on the aggregated cumulative abnormal 
returns across assets which is:  
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡1,𝑡2)







and its variance is: 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡1,𝑡2)
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Under the null hypothesis, the cumulative average abnormal return equals zero.  
 
The variance estimator of this statistic is based on the following cross-section of 
abnormal returns:  
 











Therefore, in order to isolate the musician-effect from other price variables, I took 
advantage of the renting evolutions for the same violin in order to better study this effect before 
and after the change in hands. Event study methodology will be applied to test the significance 











B.4 Empirical Analysis 
 
B.4.1 Results I 
 
After applying OLS regression techniques on hedonic modeling including the variable 
‘talented musician’, the regression result for all characteristics can be found in Table B-2.  
The Table below shows that violins played by talented musicians exerts the same 
influence on violin prices after controlling for the demand side induced by relative wealth 
growth (variable ACWI). The coefficient of ‘musician effect’ almost stays constant when 
switching from model 1 to model 2 (which includes the demand side proxy) as well as from 
model 3 (same as model 1, including the variable provenance) to model 4 (same as model 3, 
including the demand side proxy). The premium of a violin being played by a notorious 
musician fluctuates in the region of 15%.  
As time progresses, more talented musicians compete to play top quality violins and this 
further increases the scarcity, due to the fixed supply, for violins made by top makers. This fact 
is reflected in the variable maker which pushes the price up at the pace of 3.9% each year. It 
should be noted that there exists a selection bias in the data as the database used is limited to 
top-quality violins made mostly by top makers.  
It is also observed a preference for violins with Stradivari varnish, which is a proxy for 
sound quality; and a descending demand and interest towards the identical by size item 
auctioned as seen in variable LOB. 
Past provenance track provides a good proxy for guaranteed quality and therefore, it is 
























Previously, we have discussed the objective violin price determinants deriving from 
intrinsic quality characteristics and auction market mechanisms. We now turn to examine the 
‘musician effect’ on violin price determination. Subjective elements are as crucial as objective 
ones for pricing experienced goods such as music instruments that are enjoyed by being played. 
Probably the most important subjective element is musician’s choice to play an 
instrument over another. Without professional music knowledge, most non-expert violin 
investors and collectors rely mainly on well-known musician’s choices as well as on past 
provenance, and they are willing to pay a premium based on this. Most violins acquisitions, 
consider the most those violins that have “belonged” to renown musicians (through the renting 
scheme aforementioned) when purchasing the instrument. Moreover, the final price realized in 
auction houses is mainly affected by the pre-set estimate, which is also determined by 
subjective elements such as provenience and musician track.  
The regression result confirms this argument indicating 14.5% marginal effect of 
‘musician effect’ of violin price, which is both economically and statistically significant. 
Therefore, by this study we can empirically confirm a positive ‘musician effect’ in this niche 
Var. M1 M2 M3 M4 
- 6.680*** -6.805*** -8.468*** -8.480*** 
(0.13813) (0.13764) (0.14017) (0.13972) 
0.145*** 0.145*** 0.157*** 0.157*** 
(0.00026) (0.00026) (0.00022) (0.00022) 
0.022*** 0.022*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 
(0.00139) (0.00139) (0.00006) (0.00006) 
0.011*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
(0.00063) (0.00063) (0.00062) (0.00062) 
-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 





Obs. 456 456 456 456
Root Mean SE 0.580 0.578 0.588 0.586 
Adjusted R2 0.788 0.790 0.775 0.777 









market. To ease the concern of collinearity between musician and other price explanatory 
variables, ‘musician effect’ is left on the left-hand side and a regression is carried on all other 
variables; the R2 is 0.44 and Variance Inflation Factor is 1.6, which indicates the low 
possibility of collinearity in the hedonic regression model.  
The estimated coefficient of wealth growth is 0.5436, which is economically and 
statistically significant. It means that violin buyers are willing to pay half more if their wealth 
grows one time given other elements remain constant. However, the regression result 
exhibits almost the same ‘musician effect’ as the one without the ACWI index variable. It can 
be concluded from this that ‘musician effect’ has its own influence regardless of the investor’s 
wealth, which determines the marginal utility of buying and consuming a top violin. 
 
Further analysis on ‘musician effect’ has been carried out and results summarized in 
Table B- 3. Panel A shows ‘musician effect’ increasing with musician reputation from 8.7% 
(talented musician) to 10.9% (established musician). The market gives more credit to notorious 
musicians, and the overall reputation effect exhibits convexity.  
Table B- 3  
Regression results of “musician” effect  




50-79  8.68%  0.0036  24.674  0.0000  
80-95  8.12%  0.0012  76.801  0.0000  
96-100  10.99%  0.0007  131.283  0.0000  
    
11.04%  0.0003  363.201  0.0000    1-3 
Panel B.  4-6 10.11%  0.0004  241.950  0.0000  
Provenance >6 9.96%  0.0007  131.872  0.0000  
  
80-90  
        
  9.79%  0.0004  261.857  0.0000  
Panel C.  91-00  9.98%  0.0006  163.862  0.0000  
Sample Period  01-10  10.21%  0.0003  288.995  0.0000  
  11-19  11.68%  0.0004  319.064  0.0000  
 
 
The empirical result demonstrated in Panel B rejects the assumption that the ‘musician 
effect’ has a more significant impact in the violins with more important provenance. No 
significant difference in ‘musician effect’ exists between the violins with little provenance and 
the ones with a rich historical past. Therefore, it could be concluded from this result that the 
‘musician effect’ has a more important role as a price determinant of a violin than past 
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ownership history of that same violin. Panel C reveals that ‘musician effect’ increasingly 
influences violin prices over time.  
 
It is also found that less reputed violins are more sensitive to a musician choosing them 
as instrument being rented/played. Below, in Table B -4 Panel A, it is evidenced that musician 
choice has a higher impact on less reputed violins with lower ownership past. The results of 
Table B-4 Panel B show that musician’s effect has a more significant influence on prices of 
violins made by non-top luthiers with lower provenance history. 
 
Table B- 4  







In Panel B, I separate the data into subsets grouping them by top maker (Strads/del Gesu, 
and the rest) which is a proxy for quality, and by provenance which is a proxy for reputation 
(high provenance is defined as a violin having past history of 4 or more past notorious owners). 
The table above portrays that the ‘musician effect’ is more prominent on the prices of 
non-top maker violins with a low provenance track record. It is seen that there is a 16.3% price 
premium for one extra unit of a musician playing a non-top maker violin with low provenance 
compared to only a 6.9% in the case of a top maker violin with a high provenance track record. 
Violin collectors and investors seem to turn more their attention to violins that come from 
less renown makers and are rented/played by talented musicians. Therefore, the price remains 
sensitive to musician’s choice. 
Panel A Coefficient SE t-Stat p-Value 
Maker Non-Top 11.73% 0.0002 354.013 0.0000 
Top 9.73% 0.0008 93.152 0.0000 
Provenance Low 12.37% 0.0006 241.612 0.0000 
High 11.26% 0.0003 442.257 0.0000 
14.8%*** 14.8%*** 12.4%*** 14.2%*** 16.3%*** 13.9%*** 
(0.00094) (0.00094) (0.00046) (0.00066) (0.00082) (0.00044) 
6.9%*** 6.5%*** 5.4%*** 9.8%*** 7.0%*** 8.9%*** 




Maker High Low All High Low 
Panel B 




B.4.2 Results II 
Although price variations are controlled as much as possible when modeling, sample bias 
is inevitable in segmentation analysis. Therefore, the event study methodology is introduced to 
analyze ‘musician effect’ and to isolated it from other price determinants. The evolution of 
musician choice towards the same violin-maker pairs is chosen as the event of interest. This 
evidence hints at an innovative approach to isolate the real ‘musician effect’ from other price 
determinants. 
In the data sample for event study, 144 violin pairs of violins with similar characteristics 
(maker, varnish, LOB, age) have been included, where one has been played by one or various 
talented musicians and the other has not; the data consists of 2334 observations in total. 53 
violins out of these 144 violin pairs have been played by at least one re-known musician. Table 
B -1 Panel B provides summary statistics of the data used for this study. 
Event window does not cover the period before the event date as the market cannot figure 
out beforehand which violins will be chosen to be played by notorious musicians.  
Under the empirical analysis, the data sample is categorized into three groups by changes 
in number of talented musicians playing the same violin: downgrade from 1 to 0 (1, 0) when 
the violin is left; upgrade from 1 to 2, (1, 2) when the violin is taken over by a more notorious 
musician; and, upgrade 3 or more (>=3) when the same violin has been revaluated a third time 
by a talented violinist. The logic behind is that the market may react to the number of talented 
musicians playing the same instrument specially when 3 or more talented musicians decide to 
put hands on the same violin. It is expected that the effect might not be as significant when 
only one musician plays the instrument or even worse, if the instrument is left by the musician.  
Further, abnormal returns have been calculated for several time horizons to control for 
this effect diminishing over time. After running the hedonic regression in the estimation 
window, it is expected that the positive change with an increase in the number of notorious 
musicians playing a violin will have a positive influence on violin prices, and that the abnormal 
return will be significantly different from 0.  
The result in Table B -5 below illustrates the result of event study taking into account 
the change in hands of musicians playing same violin which is a proxy of revaluation/revising 
the instrument’s rating.  
When all data is included in Panel A, a negative impact on prices is found when 
violins are downgraded by musicians (<=1). This negative impact diminishes over time as the 
market reflects this change in hands mostly during the period closest to the event date and loses 
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sensitivity in the following weeks. A similar result appears in the positive revision case, when 
an additional musician plays the same instrument – it is observed that the cross average of 
cumulative abnormal return is 19.17% during the first two weeks and, decreases over time to 
3.36% after one month. The cross average of cumulative abnormal return for the whole period 
is 10.81% and remains significant when 3 or more musicians play the instrument.  
 
Table B -5 




Remarkably, the post-announcement effect is long lasting for positive news, and 
there exists a possibility to gain abnormal returns in the days after the information becomes 
publicly available. However, one should interpret the results with caution. Since these events 
are not very frequent and the data collection process still has room for improvement, there 
exists a need for further investigation.  
 
A last consideration has been explored: the volume difference before and after 
musician’s revision, and the results can be seen in Table B -6. Violins left/downgraded by 
musicians tend to be exposed (or at least sold) less, around 15% to 35%, in auction sales for all 
time horizons, and the opposite result is found for upgraded violins. Musician’s adverse 
revision has a negative impact on violin auction volume.  
As result, this event study demonstrates that musicians are seen as the best violin 
connoisseurs and this is demonstrated by the fact that they do have a strong influence on violin 
auction price via their instrument preferences. When the instrument is played by 3 or more 
musicians, the price immediately reflects this by a sharp and immediate increase in price that 
lasts throughout the whole sample period.  
 
 
Δmusician 1-14 15-28 29-42 whole period Obs 
-9.97%** -4.14% 1.89% -2.07% 
(0.0398) (0.0240) (0.0362) (0.0201) 
Panel A. 1.01% 8.81% 2.27% 3.88% 
All data (0.0262) (0.0112) (0.0226) (0.0163) 
19.17%* 14.23%* 3.36%* 10.81%** 
(0.0669) (0.0485) (0.0484) (0.0364) 








Table B -6 






In this study, a particular focus has been put on musician’s influence on violin prices.  
Based on the largest violin auction database constructed to date, a first analysis has 
found that both objective and subjective factors in the last decades of violin market booming 
explain 87% of the price variation in violins. Although natural endowments are essential for 
determining the quality of an instrument, auction-wise attributes and subjective determinants 
such as musician’s preferences are also crucial for violins which are enjoyable alternative 
assets.  
The musician’s effect on violin prices has an influence of 14.5% that is economically 
and statistically significant throughout the sample period and exhibits convexity. Musician’s 
effect is present regardless the past provenance of a violin. Additionally, after controlling for 
the demand side of the violin market induced from relative wealth growth, musician’s effect 
exhibits steadiness across different time spans, which implies that violin buyers (consumers, 
investors or collectors) use quality information including musician’s reputation to decide which 
violin to purchase.  
It can be also concluded that ‘musician effect’ has its own influence regardless of the 
investor’s wealth, which determines the marginal utility of buying and consuming a top violin. 
It is also seen that ‘musician effect’ increases with musician reputation from 8.7% to 
10.9% as market gives more credit to notorious musicians, and the overall reputation effect 
exhibits convexity. 
Period/days Revision Vol_before Vol_after Chng% 
(30,30) [1,∞) 32 37 15,63
(-∞,-1] 45 36 -20,00
[3,∞) 16 21 31,25
(60,60) [1,∞) 78 96 23,08
(-∞,-1] 138 98 -28,99
[3,∞) 41 54 31,71
(90,90) [1,∞) 158 181 14,56
(-∞,-1] 229 176 -23,14
[3,∞) 79 101 27,85
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Another empirical result rejects the assumption that the ‘musician effect’ has a more 
significant impact in the violins with more important provenance. No significant difference in 
‘musician effect’ exists between the violins with little provenance and the ones with a rich 
historical past. Therefore, it could be concluded from this result that the ‘musician effect’ has 
a more important role as a price determinant of a violin than the past ownership of that same 
violin. It is also revealed that ‘musician effect’ increasingly influences violin prices over time.  
Another interesting result from the study also reveals that musician’s effect has a more 
significant influence on prices of violins made by non-top luthiers and with lower provenance 
history. It is seen that there is a 16.3% price premium for one extra unit of a musician playing 
a non-top maker violin with low provenance compared to only a 6.9% in the case of a top 
maker violin with a high provenance track record. Violin buyers rely on musician’s preferences 
when distinguishing a high-quality violin and hence, the price they are willing to pay remains 
more sensitive to musician’s choice. 
Finally, by using event study methodology, the ‘musician effect’ is isolated from other 
price determinants and this unveils that the market significantly reflects musician’s revisions 
by the fact of changing hands to more talented musicians in the short term and, that this effect 
diminishes over time. More specifically, a negative impact on prices is found when violins are 
downgraded by musicians that diminishes over time as the market reflects this change in hands 
mostly during the period closest to the event date and loses sensitivity in the following weeks. 
A similar result appears in the positive revision case, when an additional musician plays the 
same instrument – it is observed that the cross average of cumulative abnormal return is 19.17% 
during the first two weeks and decreases over time to 3.36% after one month. The cross average 
of cumulative abnormal return for the whole period is 10.81% and remains significant when 3 
or more musicians play the instrument. 
Violins left/downgraded by musicians tend to be exposed (or at least sold) less, around 
15% to 35%, in auction sales for all time horizons, and the opposite result is found for upgraded 
violins. Musician’s adverse revision has a negative impact on violin auction volume.  
Without receiving professional intra market knowledge and acoustic training, non-
expert violin investors and consumers rely on well-known musician’ preferences for guidance; 







7.Discussion and General Conclusion 
7.1 Discussion 
        What picture of violins as an alternative form of investment emerges from my overall 
thesis? In general, violins seem to underperform other asset classes, which makes it a rather 
poor investment vehicle. Although most studies underline that violins retains real value in 
the long run, some authors observe that the studied violins have actually depreciated in 
value in real terms over certain periods of time. No matter whether as a result of some 
behavioral factors or unfavorable shifts in tastes and fashions, this shows that investing in 
violins is a risky undertaking. Preferences change and new trends set in; also, potential 
theft, damage, fire, forgery, or misattribution all further add to the risk of holding a violin 
for purely financial gains. 
          Nevertheless, this does not mean that an individual wishing to allocate his/her 
financial means in a violin should abandon the idea and choose a more lucrative form of 
investment. Even though, due to the high risk and fairly low rate of return, violins might 
appear to be ill-suited for this purpose, it seems that investors may actually benefit from 
making such a move.  
Investing in violins can yield personal satisfaction, alongside the preservation of an 
art-form that has been cherished throughout several centuries, while offering a stable and 
rewarding return. Both to musicians and to most collectors and investors they provide non-
monetary dividends in the form of enjoyment. 
From the analysis I have made, we can see that violin market seems to offer some 
avenues for benefiting from owning a violin. Moreover, potential gains could be further 
enhanced by constructing an optimal violin portfolio, diversified across different stringed 
musical instruments. This should be of interest not only to the individuals considering 
investing in a collection of violins, but primarily to music funds and other business 
interested in the music market as a source of financial gains. 
         However, the crucial question for those wishing to hold a violin in hope of its 
monetary appreciation is whether it is really possible to predict violin price movements 
and thus beat the market. This still remains a puzzle. The ‘nobody knows’ seems to be 
inherent to the emotional assets world. However, the history shows that major makers 
systematically appreciated over time. Connoisseurship and experience may give an 
 62 
investor a competitive edge over other market participants and enhance the returns. On the 
other hand, the experience of some failed violin funds might indicate that even expert 
knowledge and extensive net may not guarantee a successful investment.  
         If we look into the practical implications for the fund sector for an investment into 
the fine violin sector. The fund industry is extremely large and the size of the musical 
instrument market, although growing, is relatively small in comparison. It is therefore 
implausible for extremely large institutional investors to adapt a strategy of a large 
investment into fine violins into their investment strategies. More interesting however, is 
the choice for more tailor-made solutions to be offered to high net worth clients, who are 
aiming for a high-risk investment in an alternative asset.  
 
7.2 Overall Conclusion 
       In this thesis, various aspects of the violin auction market have been revised and its 
relevance to financial investments has been examined. Violins are first introduced as an 
alternative investment asset class and the violin auction market is explored. In order to reach 
solid conclusions, the most extensive violin auction dataset has been constructed, spanning 
from 1900 until today, although for this research there is a focus on the period spanning 
from1980’s to today. The readiness of this data sample has contributed in order to investigate 
some fundamental concepts of this niche market and provides a concrete foundation for further 
research on this particular alternative investment asset class. In addition to creating this unique 
dataset, the main contributions are summarized as follows.  
        Individual and institutional investors have started allocating fine and rare violins to their 
portfolios for investment purposes given that in the recent decades the market for this particular 
investment has gained attention, specially, from the emerging economies. Researchers, 
however, have not done extensive research in this area but, rather very little research exists. In 
order to contribute to this gap, I have studied the viability of violin investment. 
Proper price indices have been constructed taking into account the heterogeneous 
characteristics of violins. Therefore, I initially constructed well-diversified violin indices based 
on the unique individual sales auction dataset to study the investment perspective of violins 
and to analyze its diversification potential in an optimal portfolio. First results find that the 
violins made by Stradivari luthier provided the highest performance since the 1980’s until 
today, with an unsmoothed geometric annual return between 4.9- and 7.7%. The rest of violins 
in the sample, however, provided a less favorable performance although stable in the long-run 
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of almost 3.5-6.7% unsmoothed annual geometric mean return per year. The historical violin 
price indices indicate that investing in fine violins, specially, from top makers, may provide a 
promising return potential in the long run.  
      The thesis also moves one step further to unveil investing in fine violins illustrates a valid 
mean of diversification. Including Stradivari into a diversified portfolio raises the Sharpe ratio 
by 12%, after unsmoothing, from 1980 until today and improves the efficient frontier under 
CAPM assumption.  
It is interesting to note that when accounting for the bias nature of the series, and by 
unsmoothing the data to adjust the volatility to values more in line with the true underlying 
series, the same positive conclusion arises due to the low correlation between violins and other 
financial asset classes, including art, that renders an investment into violins highly attractive 
as part of a diversified portfolio strategy.  
After unsmoothing the violin return series, it is found that the standard deviation of real 
returns is higher than that of bonds, and relatively close to equities. After accounting for non-
synchronicity in the returns of violins and equities, it can be concluded that there is a positive 
correlation between real equity and violin returns, but that the beta of violins is still relatively 
low.  
Further, strong evidence is found that violins hedge against expected inflation, and with 
weaker support, it is also found that violins hedge against unanticipated inflation.  
In addition, when taking into account differences in holding periods and in transaction 
costs, it is observed that the realized returns on violins and equities may be closer to each other 
than one might conclude at first sight. The transaction costs associated with buying and selling 
violins are significantly higher than on an average trade of financial securities. However, if one 
takes into account the long average holding periods of violins on the one hand, and the high 
turnover in many financial portfolios on the other, the transaction cost drag associated with an 
average violin may actually be lower than that of many financial portfolios18. Of course, the 
low turnover in collectibles may in part be endogenous: there can be little doubt that high 
round-trip costs curtail turnover. It has been seen that positive returns start after 4 years of a 
buy-and-hold strategy. 
 
18 There is evidence that investors trade too much in financial markets: see, for example, Barber and Odean (2000). Therefore, 
my argument might be flawed to the extent that we are comparing violin investments with suboptimal behavior in financial 
markets.  
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As an alternative asset class, violins have characteristics that are clearly different from 
those of stocks or other financial securities. Just like other collectibles, violins do not give rise 
to future cash flows, on which the valuation of traditional assets is based. In line with this idea, 
the analysis has hinted at the existence of a wealth effect: there is a positive correlation between 
the returns on equities and those on violins.   
 To continue my analysis, I have explored the price-determined factors of violins with 
a particular focus on maker and musician influence. It was observed that in regression results, 
the variable maker played an important role on price. Both objective and subjective factors 
resulted in the last two decades of violin market booming.  
        In the study of the ‘masterpiece effect’ on violin price, I assert whether Stradivari’s 
influence is economically and statistically significant throughout the sample period. For this 
study, a repeated sales database from 1860-2011 is constructed. We test the ‘masterpiece 
effect’ under two different criteria: by top prices and by reputation and reach the same 
conclusion, that violins made by Stradivari and del Gesù have higher returns than the rest. We 
also further analyze the database by dividing it into two sub-samples, one for violins sold 
through auction houses and another for violins sold through private dealers, in order to explore 
if there is a difference when looking into ‘masterpiece effect’. We find that returns of violins 
sold through private dealers, as expected, are higher. We also certify that the ‘masterpiece 
effect’ appears when violins are sold privately through dealers. On the contrary, no 
‘masterpiece effect’ seems to arise when violins are sold through auction houses, which is an 
interesting finding. 
It is important to note that even though a ‘work-of-art effect’ has been proved negative 
in the art market for most studies, we have seen that it is positive in the violin market, specially 
in the case of violins sold through private dealers. It is therefore more advisable to put all the 
money in an important violin piece rather than in various violins of lower value. Therefore, we 
can agree with Agnello (2002), who advises to “buy the very best you can afford, so long as 
you can afford to buy the very best”. 
Regarding the second study exploring the so-called “musician” effect, I can conclude 
that enjoyable asset classes such as violins include subjective price determinants that should 
be accounted for when analyzing the investment opportunity of this asset class. In the case of 
fine stringed instruments such as violins, musician preference over a violin clearly has an 
impact on its price. The analysis carried out allows to conclude that regardless past provenance 
record of the instrument or demand factors such as investor’s wealth, musicians’ choice over 
an instrument influences price significantly and this effect increases with musicians’ 
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reputation. Further “musician” effect is more amplified in the case of violins made by less 
renown makers and with a low provenance track. When isolating ‘musician effect’ by event 
study methodology, we observe that revisions done by musicians over violins (revisions 
defined as interest over renting and playing a violin by musicians) impacts significantly the 
price of the violin changing hands. It is also observed that this effect diminishes in the long 
run, specially, when there is a downgrade. Finally, we observe a lower trading volume in those 
violins downgraded while the trading volume rises in violins upgraded by talented musicians. 
These empirical results are new to this niche market and contribute to the existing literature by 
adding a new perspective. 
As an overall conclusion, owing to the smaller scale of the market I would not advise 
institutional investors to participate in such a strategy; however, for the private client, an 
investment into violins could be an interesting alternative to include in the portfolio as optimal 
portfolio allocations using empirical returns over the past 39 years provide support for 
investors to consider an investment into violins as an attractive, albeit small addition to their 
investment strategy. The results depend crucially on the assumption about the risk involved 
in such a strategy. The highly illiquid market is a factor that should increase the riskiness to 
the private investor from such a strategy. I would conclude that collecting for “passion over 
profit” — a statement true for 57% of collectors with at least $1 million who were surveyed 
by UBS19; should be the best advice for an investor.
 
19 “For Love Not Money” report in 2017 UBS found that of 2,475 wealthy individuals surveyed, about 25% collect something 
— whether coins, jewelry, art, violins or cars. They collect because it’s their passion (57%), because they want to be surrounded 
by beautiful things (42%), because it connects them to family or their culture (26%) or because they enjoy the social aspects 
(18%). Only 14% want to diversify from traditional assets and 13% plan to profit. As evidence of their passion, four out of 
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Table 2- 1 Summary Statistics for the whole Database 
Variable Obs. Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Sold_USD 50485 13111,76 92369,36 101 15821285 
LOB 28466 39,41 11,04 22,5 39,32 
AGE 18678 114,21 70,69 1 444 
Year_made 18686 1881,46 81,68 1574 2018 




Table 2- 3 Summary Statistics by Maker 
Nicolo Amati was the grandson of Andrea Amati, one of the very first violin makers and the 
founder of the Amati dynasty.  Nicolo's instruments are considered the most refined and 
concert-worthy of the family's production, which extended over a two-hundred-year period. 
Since 1980, prices for his instruments have increased at an average annual rate of 8.6%. Dealer 
prices for fine Nicolo Amati violins are around USD600,000. 
 
Giovanni Battista (abbrev. G. B. or J. B.)  Guadagnini (1711-1786) was an itinerant violin 
maker who plied his trade in Piacenza, Milan, Cremona, Parma, and Turin, with stylistic 
developments marking his work in each locale.  Auction prices have risen at an average annual 
rate of 9.5%.  Dealer prices for fine examples have exceeded USD1.5M. 
 
A contemporary of Nicolo Amati and Antonio Stradivari, Francesco Ruggieri made elegant 
instruments that are moderately priced by comparison. At auction, his violins have increased 
at an average annual rate of 3.9% It is likely that Ruggieri's instruments will see a dramatic 
upturn in the future. 
 
Born in 1777 in Lequio Berria, a small town in the vicinity of Alba, Giovanni Pressenda 
moved to Turin around 1818, where he worked for a number of French violin makers 
established there. He opened his own shop in that city around 1822 and continued to work 
there until his death in 1854. He is considered one of the finest makers of the nineteenth 
century. Since the early 1980s, his violins have increased at an average annual rate of 5.0%. 
 
The younger brother of the noted maker Giuseppe Scarampella, Stefano Scarampella was 
born in Brescia in 1843. In his early years, he worked as a shopkeeper and carpenter. He 
moved to Mantua in 1886, though he was not formally registered there as a maker of violins 
until around 1890, the same year he was awarded a silver medal at a crafts exposition in that 
city. Noted for their fine tonal quality, Stefano Scarampella's violins have increased at an 
average annual rate of 9.3%. 
 
Carlo Antonio Testore, the son of the violin maker Carlo Giuseppe Testore, was born in Milan 
in 1687 and worked there under the "Sign of the Eagle" until his death in 1765.  The 
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workmanship and appearance of his instruments are often rough, but the tonal quality is 
superb. The auction prices of his violins have increased at an average annual rate of 4.8%. 
 
Antonio Gragnani (1740-1794) worked in Livorno. His instruments show the influence of 
Stradivari, Amati, and Gagliano, and are noted for their tonal fullness and brilliance. They are 
generally branded "A.G." on the button and at the end pin. At auction, they have increased at 
an average annual rate of 6.0%. 
 
 
Stradivari Obs. Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Sold_USD 265 76038,97 19168,93 57991 15821265 
AuctionDate 265 1985,69 15,80 1901 2019 
LOB 55 412,49 431,75 353 355 
Year_made 85 1709 17,81 1667 1738 
      
Guarnieri del 
Gesù Obs. Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Sold_USD 258 189347,17 315446,47 3840 2333182 
AuctionDate 258 1986,49 18,15 1900 2019 
LOB 43 354,20 1,58 350 358 
Year_made 56 1714,11 16,67 1680 1743 
      
Amati Obs. Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Sold_USD 234 102331,36 130391,93 1837 654590 
AuctionDate 234 1993,40 13,31 1963 2017 
LOB 72 351,69 3,78 335 357 
Year_made 74 1646,09 29,37 1574 1710 
      
Gagliano Obs. Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Sold_USD 707 55799,38 51472,72 1036 344229 
AuctionDate 707 1994,86 12,73 1966 2017 
LOB 253 353,72 8,11 296 421 
Year_made 238 1769,86 29,87 1700 1880 
      
Grancino Obs. Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Sold_USD 143 64754,30 51795,45 4764 233338 
AuctionDate 143 1996,93 11,28 1969 2017 
LOB 39 354,28 2,13 350 363 
Year_made 30 1701,10 15,43 1662 1736 
      
Guadagnini Obs. Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Sold_USD 250 139848,30 205421,78 1000 1390000 
AuctionDate 250 1993,69 12,47 1966 2019 
LOB 84 354,60 2,25 348 361 
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Year_made 92 1790,74 59,83 1736 1946 
      
      
Pressenda Obs. Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Sold_USD 124 144168,34 117267,09 2304 475750 
AuctionDate 124 1997,61 12,85 1969 2015 
LOB 50 355,44 1,342 353 360 
Year_made 124 1834,18 6,70 1824 1848 
      
Villaume Obs. Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Sold_USD 378 44446,12 82506,08 268 1361015 
AuctionDate 378 1996,58 11,2150182 1967 2018 
LOB 272 357,05 7,63 288 377 
Year_made 217 1851,80 18,90 1694 1885 
      
OTHER_MAKER Obs. Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Sold_USD 38912 9822,88 25410,42 101 1001386 
AuctionDate 38912 1997,70 9,73 1963 2019 
LOB 20650 356,75 14,72 145 1938 





Table 2- 6 Violin Returns 
Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics of returns for all asset classes. We can see that real 
estate enjoyed overall the highest average return in these 39 years given the financial crisis, 
whereas corporate bonds provided the highest Sharpe ratio due to its low variation. Stradivari 
index provided relative higher average returns to investors than S&P, Gold and the MSCI 
ACWI but lower than REITs. All_Violins provide similar returns to Gold. Stradivari violins 
achieved the highest performance in 1998 with 40% increase, and All_Violins produced its 
highs in 2010, with 33% and 13% annual return respectively.  
Year Violin_ALL Stradivari S&P GSCI MSCI ACWI Gold 
WORLD-DS 
REITs 
1980 0,2159 0,3459 0,1152 0,0501 0,1597 0,8924 
1981 0,1050 0,1052 -0,2400 0,1624 -0,3347 0,0851 
1982 -0,0016 -0,1714 0,0027 0,0980 0,1658 0,5975 
1983 0,1469 0,1893 0,0615 0,1567 -0,1696 0,2297 
1984 0,1143 0,0719 -0,0938 -0,2415 -0,1938 0,0576 
1985 0,1041 0,1668 0,0134 -0,1295 0,0600 0,6026 
1986 -0,1192 -0,1418 -0,1960 0,0912 0,1852 0,3567 
1987 -0,0063 0,2111 0,0362 0,1404 0,2547 -0,0438 
1988 -0,1018 0,1625 0,1057 0,0369 -0,1617 0,1174 
1989 0,0172 -0,2322 0,1357 -0,0516 -0,0107 0,1578 
1990 -0,1295 0,6201 0,0482 0,4959 -0,0249 -0,4632 
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1991 0,0404 -0,3320 -0,1918 -0,2072 -0,0992 0,6081 
1992 0,0423 0,0513 0,0303 -0,1741 -0,0593 0,3223 
1993 -0,0479 0,0681 -0,0922 0,0136 0,1719 0,3630 
1994 -0,0836 -0,0364 0,0938 0,1195 -0,0197 -0,0904 
1995 -0,0338 -0,0278 0,1329 0,2104 0,0119 0,2301 
1996 0,0598 -0,0952 0,0620 0,1532 -0,0456 0,2895 
1997 0,0904 -0,0838 -0,1837 0,1501 -0,2122 0,3692 
1998 0,0252 0,5187 -0,2519 0,1309 -0,0165 -0,2136 
1999 0,1251 -0,0695 0,4948 0,1843 0,0155 -0,0565 
2000 -0,2179 0,1294 0,2516 0,0714 -0,0630 0,2691 
2001 0,0384 -0,1702 -0,3016 -0,2027 0,0152 -0,0063 
2002 -0,1772 -0,0819 0,4135 -0,1613 0,2627 -0,0331 
2003 0,1320 0,1341 0,0642 -0,0060 0,1878 0,2599 
2004 -0,0210 0,1052 0,1978 0,2250 0,0521 0,2260 
2005 -0,1201 0,0101 0,3747 0,1168 0,1826 0,0041 
2006 0,1465 0,1842 0,0152 0,1678 0,2340 0,3302 
2007 0,1310 0,0177 0,4072 0,1718 0,3175 -0,1468 
2008 -0,0250 -0,4555 -0,4639 -0,1793 0,0449 -0,4907 
2009 -0,1626 0,3499 0,6010 -0,2247 0,2523 0,2887 
2010 0,1782 0,4293 0,2016 0,1811 0,2852 0,1520 
2011 -0,1079 -0,0364 0,0261 0,0963 0,0962 -0,0326 
2012 0,3279 0,0151 -0,0021 -0,0042 0,0703 0,1828 
2013 -0,0598 -0,2716 -0,0058 0,1532 -0,2671 -0,0250 
2014 0,0699 0,3812 -0,3379 0,1165 -0,0248 0,1848 
2015 -0,0433 -0,2592 -0,2569 -0,0053 -0,0964 -0,0264 
2016 1,0173 -0,3421 0,2641 0,1053 0,0836 -0,0127 
2017 -0,0485 0,9826 0,1103 0,1527 0,1245 0,0894 
2018 -0,0852 0,2294 -0,1525 -0,0390 -0,0167 -0,0926 
2019 -0,0570 -0,1010 0,2327 0,0201 0,1180 -0,0189 








1.2 Study 1 
 





Variable N Mean St Dev Min. Max. 
Year Made 337 1 730,86 55,67 1 570,00 1 899,00 
PurchaseYear 337 1 934,10 46,86 1 849,00 2 001,00 
PurchasePrice 337 14 127,64 51 195,50 20,00 672,60 















































Table A- b Strad and del Gesù Instruments Included in Dataset 
 
 
ID Maker Built Property Name 
64 Guarneri del Gesù, Giuseppe 1740 violin Ysaye 
88 Guarneri del Gesù, Giuseppe 1735 violin Mary Portman 
90 Guarneri del Gesù, Giuseppe 1742 violin Wieniawski 
97 Guarneri del Gesù, Giuseppe 1740 violin David, Heifetz 
121 Guarneri del Gesù, Giuseppe 1735 violin Ladenburg 
213 Guarneri del Gesù, Giuseppe 1737 violin King Joseph 
255 Guarneri del Gesù, Giuseppe 1741 violin ex-Carrodus 
256 Guarneri del Gesù, Giuseppe 1742 violin Lord Wilton 
395 Guarneri del Gesù, Giuseppe 1734 violin 
ex-Gillott; Lord 
Dunmore 
406 Guarneri del Gesù, Giuseppe 1731 violin Gibson 
422 Guarneri del Gesù, Giuseppe 1736 violin Count Cessol 
428 Guarneri del Gesù, Giuseppe 1739 violin Spanish Joseph 
436 Guarneri del Gesù, Giuseppe 1744 violin Doyen 
447 Guarneri del Gesù, Giuseppe 1743 violin Carrodus 
453 Guarneri del Gesù, Giuseppe 1744 violin Ole Bull 
2723 Guarneri del Gesù, Giuseppe 1733 violin Soil 
3519 Guarneri del Gesù, Giuseppe 1736 violin Pollitzer 
3582 Guarneri del Gesù, Giuseppe 1743 violin Baron Heath 
3700 Guarneri del Gesù, Giuseppe 1729 violin Balkovic 
3826 Guarneri del Gesù, Giuseppe 1734 violin Ferni 
4918 Guarneri del Gesù, Giuseppe 1720 violin   
7249 Guarneri del Gesù, Giuseppe 1737 violin   
7698 Guarneri del Gesù, Giuseppe 1732 violin Ferni 
47 Stradivari, Antonio 1680 violin Paganini-Desaint 
50 Stradivari, Antonio 1736 cello Paganini-Ladenburg 
52 Stradivari, Antonio 1702 violin Lord Newlands 
55 Stradivari, Antonio 1714 violin Dolphin 
62 Stradivari, Antonio 1736 violin Muntz 
66 Stradivari, Antonio 1716 violin Colossus 
111 Stradivari, Antonio 1716 violin Messie 
117 Stradivari, Antonio 1699 violin Castelbarco 
118 Stradivari, Antonio 1704 violin Betts 
135 Stradivari, Antonio 1726 violin   
147 Stradivari, Antonio 1713 violin Gibson 
205 Stradivari, Antonio 1688 violin Avery; Mercury 
207 Stradivari, Antonio 1709 violin Greffuhle 
212 Stradivari, Antonio 1709 violin La Pucelle 
237 Stradivari, Antonio 1679 violin Hellier 
238 Stradivari, Antonio 1690 violin Tuscan 
239 Stradivari, Antonio 1687 violin Spanish 
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244 Stradivari, Antonio 1873 violin Rode 
261 Stradivari, Antonio 1696 viola Spanish Court 
262 Stradivari, Antonio 1701 viola MacDonald 
264 Stradivari, Antonio 1734 viola Gibson 
267 Stradivari, Antonio 1696 cello Aylesford 
269 Stradivari, Antonio 1689 cello Aylesford 
273 Stradivari, Antonio 1701 cello Servais 
278 Stradivari, Antonio 1713 cello Bass of Spain 
283 Stradivari, Antonio 1720 cello Piatti 
287 Stradivari, Antonio 1709 cello Lady Halle 
288 Stradivari, Antonio 1712 violin ex-Viotti 
289 Stradivari, Antonio 1721 violin Lady Blunt 
291 Stradivari, Antonio 1722 violin de Chaponay 
312 Stradivari, Antonio 1700 violin Taft 
413 Stradivari, Antonio 1689 violin Arditi 
438 Stradivari, Antonio 1696 cello ex-Bonjour 
472 Stradivari, Antonio 1698 violin Marie Schumann 
473 Stradivari, Antonio 1683 violin Martinelli 
486 Stradivari, Antonio 1710 violin Magaziner 
491 Stradivari, Antonio 1713 violin Sancy 
495 Stradivari, Antonio 1714 violin Leonora Jackson 
497 Stradivari, Antonio 1715 violin Lipinski 
503 Stradivari, Antonio 1717 violin Piatti 
540 Stradivari, Antonio 1737 violin Swan Song 
545 Stradivari, Antonio 1734 violin Ames 
620 Stradivari, Antonio 1723 violin Jules Falk 
622 Stradivari, Antonio 1679 violin Parera 
643 Stradivari, Antonio 1707 violin Hammer 
707 Stradivari, Antonio 1710 cello Gore-Booth 
713 Stradivari, Antonio 1703 violin Dancla 
726 Stradivari, Antonio 1690 violin Stephens 
728 Stradivari, Antonio 1711 violin Vogelweith 
729 Stradivari, Antonio 1667 violin Jenkins 
742 Stradivari, Antonio 1684 violin Soames 
753 Stradivari, Antonio 1686 violin Nachez 
755 Stradivari, Antonio 1687 violin Bertier 
756 Stradivari, Antonio 1685 violin ex-Mackenzie 
760 Stradivari, Antonio 1688 violin Derenberg 
771 Stradivari, Antonio 1694 violin Hegedus 
775 Stradivari, Antonio 1694 violin Muir-Mackenzie 
931 Stradivari, Antonio 1677 violin Sunrise 
1039 Stradivari, Antonio 1732 violin Red Diamond 
1221 Stradivari, Antonio 1703 violin Emiliani 
1263 Stradivari, Antonio 1697 violin Prince Uchtomsky 
1265 Stradivari, Antonio 1698 violin Rouse-Boughton 
1277 Stradivari, Antonio 1699 violin Kelvey 
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1282 Stradivari, Antonio 1715 violin Alard 
1289 Stradivari, Antonio 1710 violin Duc de Camposelice 
1306 Stradivari, Antonio 1700 violin Jupiter 
1335 Stradivari, Antonio 1707 violin Rivaz 
1336 Stradivari, Antonio 1707 violin Marquis de Champeaux 
1348 Stradivari, Antonio 1709 violin Marie Hall 
1358 Stradivari, Antonio 1709 violin Nachez 
1378 Stradivari, Antonio 1712 violin Hrimali 
1380 Stradivari, Antonio 1714 violin Payne 
1381 Stradivari, Antonio 1714 violin Vaillant 
1383 Stradivari, Antonio 1714 violin Adam 
1389 Stradivari, Antonio 1714 violin de Barreau 
1391 Stradivari, Antonio 1715 violin Emperor 
1393 Stradivari, Antonio 1715 violin Titian 
1398 Stradivari, Antonio 1716 violin Cessol 
1418 Stradivari, Antonio 1720 violin Gillott 
1425 Stradivari, Antonio 1717 violin Nightingale 
1430 Stradivari, Antonio 1684 cello Visconti 
1446 Stradivari, Antonio 1690 violin Theodore 
1450 Stradivari, Antonio 1691 violin Dancla 
1455 Stradivari, Antonio 1698 cello Cholmondeley 
1473 Stradivari, Antonio 1720 viola Kux 
1488 Stradivari, Antonio 1720 violin Bavarian 
1489 Stradivari, Antonio 1720 violin Woolhouse 
1499 Stradivari, Antonio 1720 violin Kreutzer 
1503 Stradivari, Antonio 1722 violin Joachim 
1517 Stradivari, Antonio 1724 violin Abergavanny 
1533 Stradivari, Antonio 1727 violin Reynier 
1552 Stradivari, Antonio 1729 violin Innes, Loder 
1564 Stradivari, Antonio 1734 violin Hercules 
1565 Stradivari, Antonio 1732 violin Arkwright 
1573 Stradivari, Antonio 1736 violin Roussy 
1574 Stradivari, Antonio 1737 violin Lord Norton 
1580 Stradivari, Antonio 1697 cello Castelbarco 
1980 Stradivari, Antonio 1736 violin Spencer Dyke 
2274 Stradivari, Antonio 1692 violin Falmouth 
2275 Stradivari, Antonio 1697 violin Molitor 
3062 Stradivari, Antonio 1694 violin Ovcharov 
3088 Stradivari, Antonio 1717 violin Eck 
3952 Stradivari, Antonio 1716 violin ex-Nachez 
4303 Stradivari, Antonio 1729 violin Lambert 
6137 Stradivari, Antonio 1686 violin   
6813 Stradivari, Antonio 1709 violin Viotti 






A.  Database Construction  
A1. Data Collection  
        The whole dataset is the combination of data currently available from the websites of 
auction houses, data coming directly from auction houses upon request, data incorporated from 
the Red Book and those coming from Tarisio’s own database. We merged all of these sources, 
deleted the duplication records and cleaned the data.  
       We created the world’s largest source of stringed instrument and bow data, containing over 
3,500 makers, 36,000 instrument and bow records, 14,000 certificates and documents, and 
57,000 historical auction price records. Tarisio incorporates its own extensive photo archive of 
instruments and bows, which contains over 210,000 photographs. 
A2. Data Cleaning and Processing  
           The primary methods used for cleaning the data have been SAS programming and 
manual operation. We performed the majority of the cleaning work via SAS programming and 
Excel, however, we encountered some obstacles: some of the original data source was coded 
into small subsamples of datasets that had to be assembled into a larger one; we also found 
input mistakenly inserted by auction house staff; and, the information order was registered 
different in the various auction houses which we consulted. Therefore, a part of the work 
required manual review and entry, which consumed much time. After cleaning the original data 
to make it orderly, we also needed to complete the stringed instrument related information, 
such as locations of the auction houses, the year built, authenticity documentation, 
varnish/colour, dimensions of the violins and so on. When we tried to obtain this information, 
we confronted the obstacles as follows.  
A2.1. Varnish Identification  
           Most of the records from the websites of auction houses fail to include color 
information. Therefore, we needed to match the records with the color by looking into the 
Cozio register, which contains a vast number of photographs. When we did this, however, the 
problem appeared that records show different tones of red and we had to come up with an 
appropriate colour for the top violins. We concluded that the Stradivari were known for its deep 
red colour - “the lustruous red varnish”; and therefore, reached the agreement to include this 




Figure AA 1 One example of difficulty to identify violin color  
This figure shows that we cannot identify the color of this violin lot from the information of this auction 










A2.2. Hammer Price Calculation  
       The raw price data collected from those websites is realized prices instead of hammer 
prices. This realized price bears different meaning depending on the auction house. Since old 
auction results, does not charge a buyer’s premium, the prices are hammer prices already. For 
recent auction houses, the realized price equals the hammer price plus buyer’s premium and 
VAT tax. However, for the remaining auction houses, the realized price includes hammer price 
and buyer’s premium only. The buyer’s premium rates change according to the auction house, 
time and hammer price. Therefore, we had to calculate the original hammer prices by deducing 
backward. We could obtain the hammer prices from the Red Book records. 
 
Figure AA 2 Family trees 
 
This figure shows the family tree description provided from Cozio’s website of Stradivari and del 
Gesù. 









A.3. Glossary of Terms in Database 
Auction houses use standard terms and phrases when describing the authenticity of instruments 
and bows. They are careful to state that the descriptions of authorship, attribution, origin, date, 
age, provenance and condition are strictly the opinions of the house and not to be considered 
as ultimate statements of truth. Furthermore, the definitions of terms and their warranties are 
specific to each house and the reader is encouraged to read the legal terminology related to 
each sale to understand their specific meaning. The following is a list of the terms most 
commonly used. 
 
IS BY: In the house opinion, the instrument is the work of the named maker. This category 
also includes instruments that were originally sold under the name of a particular dealer and 
that were made specifically for that dealer by a maker or workman who is in many cases 
unknown or unidentifiable. 
 
PROBABLY BY / POSSIBLY BY: In the house opinion, the instrument is probably or 
possibly by the named maker in whole or in part. 
 
ATTRIBUTED TO: The instrument is believed to be by the named maker by popular 
consensus or past opinion, but the auction house does not necessarily agree with the attribution. 
 
ASCRIBED TO: The instrument is believed to be by the named maker in the opinion of the 
accompanying certificates or letters, author(s) or authority(ies) whose literature or certificates 
are referred to in the footnote to the lot, but the auction house does not necessarily agree with 
the attribution. 
 
FIRM OF: In the house opinion, the instrument is the commercial production of a known 
business entity sharing the same name of the maker. 
 
WORKSHOP OF: In the house opinion, the instrument was probably executed by an unknown 
hand on the premises of and under the direct supervision of the named maker [Or] . . . executed 
in the basic style of the maker and possible under his direct supervision. 
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MADE FOR: In the house opinion, the instrument was explicitly made for the named maker 
or company by another unknown maker or company. 
 
SCHOOL OF: In the house opinion, the instrument is by a follower of the named maker or in 
the style of works associated with the place. 
 
IN THE CIRCLE OF: In the house opinion, the instrument was executed by a contemporary 
of the named maker and exhibits his characteristics. 
 
IN THE STYLE OF / IN THE MANNER OF: In the house opinion, the instrument is after the 
style of but later than the work of the named maker. 
 
LABELLED / STAMPED / BRANDED / INSCRIBED: The instrument bears such a label, 
stamp etc. but is not, in the house opinion, by the maker indicated and may be a later copy or 
modeled after work of that maker. 
 










































A.5. Stolen and Recovered Instruments registered in the Database 
 
 
Instrument Stolen Recovery 
Giovanni Battista Rogeri, Brescia, 1699, Violin 2 016 2 019 
Antonio Stradivari, Cremona, 1734, Violin, the 'Ames, Totenberg' 1 980 2 015 
Francesco Ventura Di Linarol, c. 1580, Viola 2 015 2 015 
Antonio Stradivari, Cremona, 1715, Violin, the 'Lipinski' 2 014 2 014 
Antonio Stradivari, Cremona, 1696, Violin, the 'ex-Kym' 2 010 2 013 
Andrea Guarneri, Cremona, 1684, Violin 2 001 2 012 
Antonio Stradivari, Cremona, 1721, Violin, the 'Sinsheimer, Iselin' 2 008 2 009 
Antonio & Girolamo Amati, Cremona, 1595, Viola, the 'del 
Crocifisso' 1 980 2 005 
Antonio Stradivari, Cremona, c. 1727, Violin 1 985 2 005 
Antonio Stradivari, Cremona, 1684, Cello, the 'General Kyd, Leo 
Stern' 2 004 2 004 
Antonio Stradivari, Cremona, 1671, Violin, the 'Oistrakh' 1 996 2 001 
Antonio Stradivari, Cremona, 1694, Violin, the 'Muir-MacKenzie' 1 996 1 996 
Antonio Stradivari, Cremona, 1732, Violin, the 'Duke of Alcantara' 1 967 1 995 
Antonio Stradivari, Cremona, 1717, Violin, the 'Kochanski' 1 987 1 991 
Pietro Guarneri of Venice, Venice, 1750, Violin, the 'Bailly' 1 985 1 990 
Antonio Stradivari, Cremona, 1713, Violin, the 'Gibson, Huberman' 1 936 1 985 
Antonio Stradivari, Cremona, 1712, Violin, the 'Karpilowsky, 
Benjamin' 1 953 1 953 











B.  Identification of Regressors  
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1.2 Violin-specific factors 
Many studies, especially those applying hedonic regression, identify determinants of 
emotional assets prices that are related to the characteristic features of the item. Whereas many 
are easily observable, some, especially artistic and acoustic quality, are hard to measure. As a 
consequence, translating them into quantitative terms implies a certain degree of subjectivity. 
 
1.2.1 Length of Back (LOB) 
      Size (dimensions) and weight of a violin are among the most commonly named factors 
affecting prices20. Even though size effects differ across instrument classes, a common finding 
of many studies is that prices are positively correlated with the right size. In the case or art or 
classic cars, there seems to be a critical dimension beyond which prices increase at a 
decreasing marginal rate (Sagot- Duvauroux, 2003). This is due to the fact that private and 
corporate buyers, unlike museums, are constrained in their choice by the size of the rooms in 
the apartments and offices or garages, and prefer works/cars of ‘reasonable’ size. Therefore, 
demand for the biggest artworks or cars is usually restricted to cultural institutions, which are 
able to display them (Frey and Pommerehne, 1989b). In the specific case of violins, we do 
not have this limitation but there exists an ideal ‘right-size’ (LOB of 353-355 mm) and ‘right-
weight’ (360 grams) which needs to be optimal for acoustic reasons. 
  For these reasons, I have included in the data regression this variable in terms of the ideal 
LOB and weight desired for a violin. 
 
1.2.2 Properties, technique and instrument classes 
    Most studies investigate the impact of an instrument’s physical properties (in the case of 
violins: the type of wood, colour/varnish, the period and technique) on the price. The common 
conclusion is that, on average, Cremonese violins are the most demanded, because of its wood 
properties, compared to e.g. French or other English violins. It applies even further to works 
executed during the golden period. As a result, Cremonese violins from the 17th century are 
valued the most. This can be explained by its greater durability, superior skills required for 
playing it, as well as the broader spectrum of artistic and acoustic effects it allows for (Sproule 
and Valsan, 2006 make a similar analysis for artworks). Finally, in general, violins are more 
demanded than violas, and the latter are valued higher than cellos. From the historical point 
 
20 However, Rengers and Velthuis (2002) argue that differences in size do not explain differences in prices 
across artists, only within the particular artist’s oeuvre. 
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of view, this might be perceived as a result of differences in use and popularity of use. 
However, nowadays, discrepancies in prices between various violin classes and 
country/region-specific techniques reflect rather buyers’ preferences (Sagot-Duvauroux et al., 
1992 find this same argument in emotional assets). 
 
In the data sample examined I have focused only in violins and therefore excluded other 
categories such as violas and cellos. 
 
1.2.3 Condition 
      The overall condition of a violin can influence its price. According to Singer and Lynch 
(1997), poor condition of an artwork may result in a price reduction of up to 80 per cent. In 
general, better preserved violins should be valued higher. However, even though poor 
condition of a superior-quality artifact will not be, most probably, reflected in its price, it 
might be of substantial importance in the low end of the market (ibid.).  
This is experienced in violins segment, unfortunately, the problem with reaching any 
conclusions on this matter is that data on the state of preservation is hard to obtain and 
verifying violin’s condition would imply its visual examination. Therefore, this was not 
possible to examine in the data sample. 
 
1.2.4 Attribution 
      Attribution emerges from a consensus on the nature, origin, creator and date of execution 
of a particular violin that is reached by experts. Its impact on the price is best illustrated by 
the fact that changes in attribution are always followed by adjustments in the price. The 
direction, in which the market value will change, depends ultimately on the reputation and 
standing of both the previous and newly established luthiers. Moreover, attribution may be 
accompanied by a certain degree of uncertainty, which is discounted in the monetary valuation 
(Savage, 1969). This is of particular importance on the market for old violins, which were 
often created in luthiers’ workshops and only signed by the master. Therefore, there exists a 
‘hierarchy’ of degrees of attribution, which affect the hammer price to a varying extent.  
In the sample, we measure for the violins that have been: “attributed”, “made by”, “ascribed 
to” and “signed by” and where we have the certificates, signature, label or any other kind of 
proof of being created by the maker itself. These are contrasted to items that are: “made for”, 
“school of”, “in the circle of”, “in the workshop of” which do not show a firm certainty of its 
creation by the luthier itself. This is collected under the variable “authenticity” that will be 
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explained next.  
 
 
1.2.5 Authenticity  
 
         Authenticity21, a variable that reflects the value of originality and novelty of the maker’s 
oeuvre, is one of the major factors affecting violin prices. This is reflected in the fact that once 
violin’s genuineness is questioned, a substantial drop in its market valuation can be observed 
(Sagot-Duvauroux et al., 1992). Therefore, some authors (e.g. Renneboog and Van Houtte, 
2002) conclude that a signature positively affects the price, as it is commonly perceived as a 
proxy for authenticity. Moreover, a visible signature may provide the owner with consumption 
and prestige benefits (Czujack, 1997). However, it could be equally argued that a signature 
might be forged, and thus violin’s authenticity can be proved only through expertise22. 
Therefore, some makers do not identify such an ample effect of signature on the price. This 
may be due to the fact that a signature matters more in the mid-to-high end of the market, 
since it serves as the only proxy for item’s authenticity, whereas the genuineness of 
superior/top-quality items can be determined even if they are not signed (Ursprung and 
Wiermann, 2008). In violins, this can be seen in Strads and del Gesu which are all already 




         The question whether violin’s provenance has a significant impact on the price is still 
open to debate. It can be argued that prestigious provenance can be interpreted as a proof of 
superior quality and authenticity, and thus positively affect its price (de la Barre et al., 1994). 
It may also reduce the risk that its quality will be negatively verified by history, which would 
result in a future loss of value (Landes, 2000). Moreover, esteemed provenance might 
reconfirm the buyer’s aesthetic judgment (Plattner, 1996). Finally, previous owners’ high 
reputation may be a source of prestige and status benefits for the buyer (Landes, 2000). 
 
21 Those include: ‘work by’ (‘signature of’) (work was executed by the luthier herself), ‘attributed to’ (work 
may have been wholly or partly created by the luthier), ‘studio (workshop) of’ (work was executed in 
luthier’s workshop under her supervision), ‘school of’ (work was created by a pupil or follower of the luthier 
up to 50 years after her death), ‘in the style (manner) of’ (attribution is dubious) (Sagot-Duvauroux, 2003). 
22 Violins with proven  authenticity  are  registered  in  catalogue raisonné.  However, this does  not  totally 
eliminate the risk of misattribution. In the new market segment, violin’s authenticity is confirmed by certificates 
obtained from makers, auction houses or art dealers. 
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International auction houses seem to share this point of view, since they include information 
on past owners in the pre-auction catalogues. However, this considerable ‘celebrity 
premium’23 could be equally attributed to connoisseurship and superior knowledge that 
enabled them to compose the collection only of the top-quality works (ibid.). Moreover, the 
positive effect of provenance on the price could be also a result of auction house’s promotional 
efforts and media hype surrounding the sale. On the other hand, based on her findings, 
Czujack (1997, p.239) concludes that ‘prestigious provenance hardly matters’. 
 This variable was not available for all violins in the database, therefore it could not be 
examined in the analysis. 
 
1.2.7 Time of creation 
Time of creation is an important factor for several reasons. First of all, it may be correlated 
with violin’s style and preciseness. Secondly, it is also associated with the maker period, in 
which the luthier was active when he executed the work – time of top achievements and 
greatest innovations, or rather artistic indolence and misconceptions24 . All those aspects may 
be, in turn, reflected in the price (Anderson, 1974). Some studies (e.g. Ursprung and 
Wiermann, 2008) identify the effect of the period of creation on the price.  
This component is gathered under variable “year made” in the dataset. 
 
1.2.8 Rarity and scarcity25 
     Although it might seem that violins typical for a particular maker should fetch higher 
prices, since buyers might rather want to own something representative for his oeuvre, this 
is not necessarily the rule. If violins are rare in style, varnish, material, etc., but at the same 
time their quality is not inferior, scarcity may positively further affect prices. As a general 
 
23 Pesando and Shum (2007) refer to it as ‘irrational exuberance’. 
24 For example, for a selected group of artists, de la Barre et al. (1994) observe substantial differences in prices 
fetched by works executed at different points in artists’ careers. Also in the case of Antonio Stradivari, the violins 
performed during his early years share similarities to the ones from his tutor Amati, and the ones elaborated later 
have the famous red varnish as well as the noted decorations which make them more valuable. 
 
25 Rarity and scarcity refer also to the supply side. Scarce works may be valued higher on average, since their 
limited supply can enhance buyers’ willingness to pay (Czujack, 1997). According to Ursprung and Wiermann 
(2008), and Lazarro (2006), a significant increase in supply might lead to a decline in price, although this 
effect is not very large. Moreover, Sagot-Duvauroux et al. (1992) claim that the impact of scarcity on prices is 
positively correlated with artist’s fame. Finally, growing scarcity of works within a particular market segment, 
especially in the lower end of the market, might lead to an increase in prices of works considered close 
substitutes (ibid.). Low supply may be caused by many factors, e.g. dealer’s conscious strategy (ibid.), or cultural 
institutions’ reluctance to deaccession works created by a given artist. 
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rule, old European violins are limited in supply and supply is in decrease which preserves 
the high and ever increasing prices in this market. 
This is a component inherent in all the violins in the sample as the database is dedicated 
solely to fine old violins and rare modern ones. 
 
1.2.9 Violin’s history 
 
      Many events in violin’s history can positively influence its price. Those include, among 
others: taking part in domestic and international concerts, being mentioned in literature 
and academic publications, remaining in major public or private collections, being 
considered a part of national heritage. In general, the number of exhibitions and 
publications the item appeared in is positively correlated with the price (Wieand et al., 
1998). The same applies to touring exhibitions, which, by reaching a wide audience, have 
a promotional effect (Czujack, 1997). However, it might be equally argued that pieces of 
superior quality are shown or discussed in the literature more often. Therefore, the fact that 
they command higher prices may result from greater artistic quality, rather than higher 
number of exhibitions or publications (ibid.). 
 As this effect is ambiguous, it has left out of the current analysis. 
 
1.2.10 Varnish and Sound quality 
 
       This variable is probably the most important among violin-related aspects (Anderson, 
1974 refers to artistic quality in a similar logic). It implies a subjective collective judgment 
of the members of the specific market’s segment, which is verified in the course of history. 
Expert valuations serve as guideposts for prospective buyers and are reflected in violin’s 
prices. Since a layman might find it difficult to evaluate sound quality, it needs to be 
ascertained by experts that are credible to the public. They, in turn, lend their credibility 
to the luthier’s violin (artist’s oeuvre in Bonus and Ronte, 1997).  
The varnish is correlated to sound potential, therefore is utmost important for the market 
of violins. We selected 5 tones of varnish typical of different locations and periods in time 
to see how prices react to this variable. 
 
1.2.11 Past prices and reference dependence (‘anchoring effect’) 
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         Some authors (e.g. Beggs and Graddy, 2007) suggest that, in making their valuations 
of a particular work, bidders may be strongly influenced by its previous hammer price (so 
called ‘anchoring effect’ or reference dependence26). Moreover, ‘anchoring effect’ may 
also appear on the auction house’s and seller’s side, and affect both pre-sale price estimates 
and reserve prices27.  
        This could, in turn, have an indirect impact on the hammer price, or even influence 
violin’s future market value although the average holding period of a violin is quite long 
and this diminishes this said effect.  
 
1.3 Luthier-related factors 
 
       According to Velthuis (2005), this group of factors plays a more important role in 
price formation than violin-specific variables. As already mentioned, it is due to a historical 
process, as a result of which an ever-increasing attention is being paid to individual 
luthiers/makers, rather than particular violins. However, whereas luthier’s name, 
reputation and standing are all significant determinants of violin prices, other aspects, such 
as age, nationality or gender seem to be of lesser importance.  
This section will further explain the maker’s important weight in price formation of violins. 
 
1.3.1 Reputation and standing 
          Among maker-related factors, artist’s reputation and standing seem to have the 
strongest impact on emotional assets prices (Frey and Pommerehne, 1989b). Similarly to 
artistic quality, they are determined by market experts, whose opinions are verified in the 
course of history. Those collective judgments are based on many aspects, such as artistic 
quality of the violin, its innovation and originality, but also maker’s past achievements and 
career. Opinions formed by members of the violin world (dealers, ateliers, restoration 
experts, directors of cultural institutions, etc.) are then disseminated through literature, 
scholarly publications and media.  
 
1.3.2 Violin’s historical significance 
 
26 Even though those terms are usually used interchangeably, Beggs and Graddy (2007) underline that their 
meaning is slightly different. 
27 However, Beggs and Graddy (2007) argue that the path-dependent nature of pre-auction price estimates could 
be also interpreted as experts’ response to the ‘anchoring effect’ on the bidders’ side. 
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        This factor is closely related to luthier/maker’s reputation and standing, and is 
determined by artistic merit and innovativeness of a particular artist, artistic group or 
movement (especially its formative years) (Singer and Lynch, 1997). Its impact on prices 
is supported by the findings of Singer and Lynch (ibid.), who discover significant 
discrepancies in market valuations of works created by innovative artists and their 
followers. Violin historical significance is reflected in many ways, e.g. in the number of 
historical publications mentioning a luthier/maker, collections or exhibitions featuring his 
works, museum acquisitions, etc.  
Most, if not all, violins included in the database share this feature. 
 
1.3.3 Fame 
        Whereas maker’s reputation and standing are determined by experts’ judgments, fame 
can result from dealers’ and auction houses’ promotional activities, or wide media 
coverage. However, in contrast to reputation and standing, fame does not always go in line 
with quality and can be equally attributed to e.g. extravagant lifestyle, or controversies 
surrounding luthier/maker’s life and her oeuvre. Nevertheless, in some cases it might 
assure an artist a place in history (Sagot-Duvauroux, 1992).  
Stradivari had an interesting relationship with Amati and the rivalry between them left 




          Past solo concerts, prizes and awards by renown musicians, domestic and 
international publications, violins lent with grants and scholarships to emerging top 
players, commissions by cultural institutions, etc. may be interpreted as signs of quality, 
and thus contribute to luthier’s reputation and success. They also serve as guideposts for 
potential buyers, who, in order to economize on information and search costs, often 
concentrate their demand only on items selected by experts and cultural institutions 
(Velthuis, 2005). Therefore, the number and importance of achievements is generally 
positively correlated with demand and, consequently, prices (Plattner, 1998). Therefore, 
the evidence on the influence of this variable on emotional assets prices is mixed (Rengers 
and Velthuis, 2002). Moreover, Bonus and Ronte (1997) argue that the number of 
exhibitions and prizes awarded to an artist is not correlated with the price of artworks, 
since it is their significance, rather than the number, that may affect the market valuation 
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of the works.  
In the case of violins the same argument could be applied as their supply is constrained 
and the achievement of the top makers has been completely attained. 
 
1.3.5 Nationality 
        In general, luthier’s nationality should not be correlated with the price level, since it is 
not related to artistic quality. In most cases (e.g. Schneider and Pommerehne, 1983), authors 
fail to identify any impact of this variable on prices. However, de la Barre et al. (1994) 
discover a relationship between the nationality and the market valuation of his works, 
although this might be also associated with the criterion the authors have chosen for 
constructing the underlying sample. Nevertheless, nationality might matter in so far as it is 
sometimes linked with the artistic period, movement or school a maker was active in.  
In the case of violins, we find the Italian and French ones always at the high end of the 
market for fine old stringed instruments. This is because the varnish quality and 
craftsmanship developed in both countries at that time in history. 
  
1.3.6 Age and creativity patterns 
         Luthier’s age plays a role in price formation in a number of ways. First of all, some 
authors (e.g. Agnello and Pierce, 1996) identify a non-linear relation between artist’s age 
at the time of sale and artwork’s price. This can be a result of buyers’ willingness to pay 
more for works created by makers in the end of their career, since they might be perceived 
as more experienced and their violins as having superior-quality. Furthermore, longer 
presence on the market might have allowed him to become more recognized and thus 
increase the demand for his oeuvre (Velthuis, 2005). Secondly, his age at the time of 
execution is related to the artistic period, school or movement, as well artistic quality. In 
his various papers, Galenson28 investigates the relationship between age at the time of 
execution and hammer price for different artistic movements and periods. He argues that 
creativity patterns vary across particular market segments29.  
Therefore, since luthier’s produce works of highest quality at various points in life, age at 
 
28 For more details see e.g. Galenson (1999, 2000, 2004), Galenson and Jensen (2001), Galenson and Weinberg 
(2000, 2001). 
29 The issue of creativity patterns is also analyzed by Edwards (2004) in a study on Latin American art. 
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which a violin was created can partly account for price differences.  
 
1.3.7 ‘Death effect’ 
           In some cases, authors (e.g. Czujack, 1997) identify the so called ‘death effect’, i.e. 
an immediate sharp increase in prices following artist’s death. When the maker dies, the 
supply of his works becomes fixed. Therefore, buyers become certain that potential 
(over)production will not depress future prices. This can, in turn, stimulate demand (also 
as a result of speculative purchases) and thus put an upward pressure on prices (Ekelund 
et al., 2000). On the other hand, during the lifetime, a luthier may be able to further enhance 
his reputation or adjust the style to current trends, which could result in higher market 
valuation of his oeuvre30 (Agnello and Pierce, 1996). Therefore, some authors (e.g. 
Buelens and Ginsburgh, 1993) conclude that the evidence on the impact of artist’s living 
status at the time of sale on the price is mixed, or even question its significance (e.g. 
Kräussl and van Elsland, 2008). In their recent study, Ursprung and Wiermann (2008) shed 
new light on this issue. They associate death-induced price changes with artist’s age at the 
time of death and find an inversely U-shaped relationship between both factors31.  
All the old fine stringed instruments in the dataset have suffered this effect and thus they 
are totally driven by it. The supply of Stradivari is limited to the 640 units surviving and 
thus its individual price surpasses the 600,000 dolls estimate. It is important to note that 
condition and the combination of variables mentioned before play a role in price 
differentiation between units. Moreover, the absolute magnitude of the ‘death effect’ 
depends on the artistic quality of the deceased maker’s oeuvre.  
 




       Experts’ influence, even though often indirect, is probably the most significant factor 
 
30 This argument is questioned by Ekelund et al. (2000), who underline that it refers rather to the supply side, 
whereas the ‘death effect’ occurs on the demand side. 
31 On the one hand, an untimely death of a promising artist may reduce demand and therewith prices of his 
oeuvre, since buyers can no longer expect the maker to build up his reputation. This reputation-driven negative 
effect on prices diminishes, however, as the maker’s career progresses and finally totally disappears. Beyond certain 
critical age, a positive ‘death effect’ resulting from the supply being fixed sets in, which, as already mentioned, 




affecting violin prices. Judgments and choices made by credible critics, dealers, directors 
of cultural institutions, etc. who serve as gatekeepers and legitimizing bodies, determine 
makers’ reputations and careers, but also shape buyers’ tastes and preferences. Their 
opinions, based on acoustic quality, merit and past achievements, are disseminated through 
media, publications, rankings, exhibitions, etc. Experts’ judgments serve, in turn, as 
reference points for buyers, who may find it hard to assess acoustic quality and, in order 
to minimize the risk of acquiring poor-quality violins, seek reassurance of their aesthetic 
valuations (Plattner, 1998). Moreover, buyers may rely on experts so as to economize on 
information and search costs (Sagot- Duvauroux, 2003). This concentration of demand on 
a limited number of selected artists further enhances their renown (so called ‘superstar 
phenomenon’32) and contributes to an increase in prices of their oeuvre (Velthuis, 2003a). 
Experts in the field of violins would be, to mention some Florian Leonhard, Jason Price, 
Peter Biddulph, Gregg T. Alf, Simon Morris and, Chris Reuning. 
 
1.4.2 Economic factors 
 
i. State of the economy 
          This variable refers to the state of the economy at the national, as well as global 
level. Whereas periods of boom on the violin market and within the economy as a whole 
do not necessarily have to occur simultaneously, they do overlap. Violins, similarly to e.g. 
luxurious goods, are purchased only when other, more basic needs are satisfied, and in 
general emotional assets are of the first commodities to be sold during economic 
downturns, especially with regard to lower-quality pieces (Mamarbachi et al., 2008). 
Therefore, times of boom on the violin market may proceed with a certain time lag, and 
violin slumps can set in only at the onset of the economic recession. Although, in general, 
increasing economic growth should be followed by higher emotional assets’ price, the 
overall effect is not always easy to forecast (Sagot-Duvauroux et al., 1992).  
        On the one hand, it can stimulate demand and supply as a result of buyers’ increasing 
wealth and sellers’ expectations of future growing prices. On the other hand, it may reduce 
demand due to greater attractiveness of some alternative forms of investment (Frey and 
Pommerehne, 1989b).  
It may be argued, however, that the latter effect applies only to alternative assets 
 
32 For more details see e.g. Adler (1985), Rosen (1981), Towse (1997) and Schulze (2003). 
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investment-oriented buyers and has thus a limited impact on general violin prices. 
 
ii. Correlation within the violin market and with other markets 
 
          Several authors (e.g. Ginsburgh and Jeanfils, 1995) examine the relationships 
between particular market segments and observe a strong correlation in price movements 
across various sub-markets. Moreover, violins’ prices seem to be influenced by market 
valuations of high-end works, which act as an exogenous price determinant. Various 
studies also investigate the correlation between emotional assets and other markets, such 
as stock or real estate market. Whereas some experts fail to identify any relationship, others 
argue that violin prices may be influenced by prices of other commodities, financial 
instruments or real estate.                    
       Those simultaneous or lagged co-movements could be explained by the overall impact 
of economic trends on price levels in general (Wieand et al., 1998). Moreover, since 
booming economy is often accompanied by bull stock market, growing share prices might 
imply an increase in violin prices. It is because a part of the gains made on the financial 
markets might be allocated into emotional assets (Chanel, 1995). On the other hand, 
individuals driven by pure investment motives could be deterred from purchasing a violin, 
if alternative forms of investment offer higher returns (which is often the case during bull 
markets). 
We can see his movements in Section 2 where new correlations between different asset 
classes are displayed. As it will be mentioned later, it is difficult to compare them as assets 





          It is argued that emotional assets (such as violins) are one of the best stores of value, 
since they retain real value in the long run and can thus serve as a hedge against inflation 
(Frey and Pommerehne, 1989b). This would imply that in times of high inflation, demand 
for violins and, therewith, violins prices should rise. However, evidence on the hedging 
potential of violins, and correlation between violin prices and inflation is mixed. Whereas 
Campbell (2004) argues that emotional assets can serve as a good inflation hedge, 
Renneboog and Van Houtte (2002) conjecture the opposite. Therefore, the role of this 
variable in violin price formation remains uncertain. 
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1.3.3 Legislation and tax regulations 
 
         In general, changes in legislation may have an indirect impact on the demand and, 
therewith, prices of violins. For example, favorable tax regulations can attract buyers and 
thus contribute to price increases. Especially in the U.S., tax benefits associated with 
donations to cultural institutions may play some role in emotional assets price formation. 
This, however, does not apply to most European countries. Probably the Brexit will bring 





 Authors (e.g. Chanel et al., 1996) argue that prices may vary according to the buyer’s 
type34. This interrelation is a result of differences in behavior, purchase motives, valuations, 
historical knowledge, information sets, and responsiveness to changing market conditions (e.g. 
risk, costs, taxes) (Frey and Eichenberger, 1995). Especially public museums’ purchases might 
generate above-average hammer prices (Pommerehne and Feld, 1997). Pommerehne and Feld 
(ibid.) explain this phenomenon by the tendency of public institutions to ignore the opportunity 
costs, which is a result of lower budget constraints and lesser external control over their 
purchases. Moreover, in general, museums’ demand is highly inelastic, since it is concentrated 
only on particular top-quality works. Another explanation provided by Singer and Lynch 
(1997) is that public museums tend to buy at the top of the demand curve – i.e. they purchase 
only when having gathered all relevant information, which minimizes the risk, but also results 
in a price premium paid. It is due to the fact that acquisitions made by public institutions are 
subject to many constraints and are scrutinized by the relevant government bodies (Frey and 
Eichenberger, 1995). Furthermore, Velthuis’ (2005) findings suggest that prices paid by 
museums affect the general price level of works within the luthier/maker’s oeuvre. This is 
because institutional recognition serves as a proxy for artistic quality, enhances maker’s 
 
33 The impact of buyers’ and sellers’ characteristics on art prices is observed by i.e. Sagot-Duvauroux et al. 
(1992). 
34 Among different types of buyers, one can name: collectors, investors and speculators, as well as private, 
corporate and institutional buyers. 
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reputation and thus stimulates demand. It should be, however, noted that the positive effect of 
a museum purchase on the hammer price refers mainly to the high end of the market 
(Pommerehne and Feld, 1997). In addition, museum acquisitions, but also purchases made by 
famous collectors, can create new fashions and influence buyers’ tastes, which may contribute 
to price increases. Finally, it can be argued that the hammer price may also depend on the 
information set possessed by the prospective buyer. Due to information asymmetry, prevalent 
on the violin market, the usually less well- informed individual buyers may be prepared to pay 
a price premium, as compared to better informed violin dealers, or individuals having expert 
or insider knowledge (Singer and Lynch, 1994). Moreover, as a part of gallery’s or art dealer’s 
strategy to maintain a certain price level for their maker’s works, as well as to avoid 
unfavorable price differences between the primary, secondary and tertiary market, auction 
prices might be inflated by the demand of those buyers (Sagot-Duvauroux et al., 1992). 
ii. Nationality 
      The impact of buyers’ nationality on violin’s prices becomes clear when considering 
the fact that, in times of boom, demand is often driven by buyers of a particular nationality. 
This was, for example, the case in the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s when 
extraordinary prices of Italian golden period violins resulted mostly from Japanese, often 
speculative, purchases
35
. It is also the case today, with the ever-growing demand coming from 
Korean, Russian and Chinese new rich classes. Since their choices are often uninformed, 
driven by either speculative or patriotic motives (Mamarbachi et al., 2008), virtually any price 
level is accepted. This does not only increase prices in particular market segments, but also 
attracts speculators who want to profit from the emerging trends and fashions, and thus put an 
upward pressure on violin prices. 
iii. Wealth 
 
        Buyers’ wealth, a variable correlated with the overall state of the economy, is one of 
the decisive factors affecting the demand side and, therewith, prices (Schneider and 
Pommerehne, 1983). However, it may be argued that the increasing prosperity of potential 
buyers can affect prices in the higher end of the market to a greater extent, relative to other 
market segments. 
 
iv. Behavior at auction 
 
 
35 For more details see e.g. Hiraki et al. (2005). 
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        Although most buyers enter the auction with some assumptions as to their willingness 
to pay (based on i.e. past prices and price estimates published in the pre-auction catalogues, 
experience, specific historical knowledge, available financial means), the hammer price might 
be an outcome of their emotional, rather than rational behavior. Under the influence of other 
auction participants’ bids, valuations might change as the auction proceeds. Therefore, the 
final price might be contingent on the ‘excitement” of a single night’ (Velthuis, 2005, p.84). 
Competitive behavior at an auction, resulting from bidders’ desire to acquire a certain piece, 
may inflate the hammer price. As noted by Moulin (1994), the price is a result of the presence 
(or absence) of particular individuals with certain valuations and financial means, determined 
to own an artifact. The fact that the buyer pays a certain price does not mean he would not be 
prepared to pay more, where he overbid by an individual with a higher willingness to pay. 
v. Number 
 
        Some authors (e.g. Sagot-Duvauroux et al., 1992) suggest that the number of bidders 
present at the auction may be positively correlated with the hammer price. This might be 
explained by the fact that a higher number of potential buyers might stimulate competitive 
behavior, which may translate into a higher final bid. However, the effect of this variable on 
the price is argued to depend on the bidders’ type – it is positive only if bidders have 





         As already mentioned, previous owner’s name and reputation can positively influence 
violin’s prices (see section Provenance). However, there are some other seller-related aspects 
that can affect the price of a violin. 
i. Reserve price 
            Even though the reserve price is an outcome of negotiations between the seller and 
auction house, the final decision on its magnitude belongs to the owner of the violin. The 
level, at which the reserve price is set, has twofold consequences. First of all, it determines 
 
36  This means that bidders’ valuations are not influenced by valuations of other auction participants. 
37  Since the center of my focus is the auction market, I introduce only the variables related to the owners and 
auction houses. However, it should be noted that characteristics of galleries and art dealers may play an equally 
important role in art price formation. 
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whether the auctioned object gets sold, or (if the hammer price does not reach the reserve 
price) is ‘bought in’ by the auction house. The latter event may, in turn, have a negative impact 
on the valuations of prospective buyers and result in the so called ‘burned’ anomaly. Secondly, 
it can indirectly influence the hammer price, as it is usually correlated with the lower bound 
of the pre-auction estimate38, which, in turn, serves as a reference point for potential buyers. 
Since it is a common practice among major auction houses to set the pre-sale estimate equal 
to or above the reserve price, by being able to negotiate a higher reserve price, seller might 
affect the estimate and thus have an indirect impact on the hammer price (Candela and Scorcu, 
1997). 
ii. Time of sale and holding period 
       The decision to sell an emotional asset at a particular point in time may be determined 
by many factors, such as: expected price, state of the economy, situation on the specific 
market, seller’s financial situation, etc. Timing is of importance not only with reference to the 
overall state of the economy and situation on the specific market (i.e. boom versus downturn 
period), but also time of the year. This is because, due to seasonality of sales, each auction 
market has its own business cycle. Therefore, depending on the month of sale, emotional 
assets may be bought at a discount or premium (Wieand et al, 1998). However, contrary to 
expectations, Agnello (2002) observes that whereas prices of emotional assets sold during top 
auction seasons are highest on average, stagnant periods are not associated with lowest prices. 
However, this finding refers to the most renowned international auction houses present on the 
market and might not necessarily apply to other national markets. Moreover, time of sale 
defines also the overall holding period (i.e. time that has elapsed since the last sale of the 
item). Some authors suggest that it may have an impact on the price. In particular, a decision 
to resell within a short period of time might result in a loss of value (so called ‘winner’s 
curse’). Czujack’s (1997) findings seem to support this view. However, Goetzmann and 
Spiegel (1995) find no evidence for the existence of this phenomenon. In the analysis, this did 
not show relevant either probably because there are only a few auction houses having stringed 
instruments and they all have the same seasonality when it comes to sales and consignments. 
 
1.4.5.2 Auction house 
 
38  It is estimated that the reserve price amounts to about 70-80 per cent of the lower bound of the pre-sale price 




i. Name and location (violation of the ‘law of one price’) 
Economic theory assumes that, on a competitive and efficient market, prices for a certain 
good are a result of the market equilibrium. If price differences occur, they do not last long, for 
they are evened out by arbitrage (Velhuis, 2005). However, empirical evidence suggests that 
the ‘law of one price’ does not hold for the emotional market39. Many authors observe 
systematic differences in prices obtained for the same or similar40 works sold at different 
auction houses41 (with greatest price premiums paid for works sold at Sotheby’s and 
Christie’s), in distinct cities or geographic regions. It could be argued that each auction is 
unique and thus the same object sold within a short period of time may fetch different prices. 
Moreover, those discrepancies could be attributed to differences in the lot ordering, ‘winner’s 
curse’, information asymmetry prevalent especially in the low end of the violin market, or 
buyers’ willingness to economize on search costs. The positive effect of major auction houses 
on the hammer price could be also explained by the selective manner in which they accept 
objects for sale. In addition, their reputation and top-quality offer might enhance buyers’ 
valuations (Sproule and Valsan, 2006). Finally, auction houses’ promotional efforts could also 
attract a larger number of wealthy bidders, which might, in turn, increase the hammer price 
(Landes, 2000). It should be, however, noted that the impact of the auction house on the price 
may vary across different sub-markets. In the dataset, most sales took place in London and 
New York (25% approx. in each city), followed by France, the market is already location-
settled as dealers, restorer and all other players of the market are established in these locations. 
 
ii. Strategy and pre-auction price estimate (bias) 
         Auction houses may exert indirect influence on the hammer price in various ways. First 
of all, as observed by Agnello (2002), works illustrated in the pre-auction catalogues may fetch 
higher prices. However, it could be equally argued that the choice to reproduce a photo of a 
particular violin in the catalogue may be guided by its superior quality, which is, in turn, 
positively correlated with the price. An auction house may also affect the hammer price through 
 
39  The ‘law of one price’ implies that, in the absence of different transaction costs, as well as trade and other 
barriers, no systematic price discrepancies between distinct markets can be observed (Ashenfelter and Graddy, 
2006; Pesando and Shum, 2007). 
 
40  By similar works I mean prints from the same edition, which are of comparable quality. 
41  For more details on the efficiency of auction houses, and the relationship between the auction house and 
hammer price see Førsund and Zanola (2001, 2002, 2006). 
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the lot ordering. Moreover, a diversified offer at a particular auction might stimulate demand 
and have a positive effect on the prices fetched (Candela and Scorcu, 1997). Finally, auction 
houses might be able to indirectly influence hammer prices through pre-auction price estimates 
(Ashenfelter and Graddy, 2003). Since experts’ appraisals may serve as reference points for 
credulous bidders (‘anchoring effect’ or reference dependence), their increase might positively 
affect their valuations (Beggs and Graddy, 2007). For example, Mei and Moses (2002a) 
observe that an upward bias in pre-auction estimates has a positive effect on hammer prices. 
On the other hand, Czujack (1997) does not identify any link between the pre-sale estimates 
and auction results. Moreover, the evidence on the existence and direction of the pre-sale 
estimate bias is mixed. Even if auction houses make systematic mistakes in their predictions, 
the question remains whether this can be attributed to their strategic behavior. 
 
1.4.6   Media 
          By focusing on certain aspects (e.g. auction records, works and careers of makers), wide 
media coverage can enhance demand and contribute to price increases in particular market 
segments (Lourgand and McDaniel, 1991). By selectively highlighting some makers, artistic 
movements, exhibitions, publications, etc. media may influence tastes and create fashions. 
Media coverage can also reinforce promotional efforts of galleries, violin dealers, auction 
houses, some famous collectors or musicians.  
 
1.4.7 Anomalies  
Similarly, to; e.g. January-, Holiday-, Christmas- or Small-firm-effect encountered on 
the financial markets, emotional assets market-specific anomalies might have an impact on 
their prices (Frey and Eichenberger, 1995). Besides the ‘winner’s curse’ and violation of the 
‘law of one price’, one should also mention the so called ‘declining price’ anomaly (‘afternoon 
effect’) and ‘morning effect’. Both phenomena indicate that the lot ordering and lot number 
might affect hammer prices. The former implies that the hammer prices, as well as hammer 
prices relative to the corresponding pre-sale estimates are more likely to fall than to rise towards 
the end of the auction. This could be a result of a smaller number of bidders (i.e. lower 
competition) present as the auction proceeds, auction houses’ strategy to order objects by date 
of creation or appraised value (in a declining manner), buyers’ risk aversion, or biased pre-
auction price estimates42 (Beggs and Graddy, 1997). The latter phenomenon has the reverse 
 
42  However, Pesando and Shum (1996) suggest that it might be also due to unobserved differences in quality. 
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effect and may be explained by the affiliated values of bidders43 (Picci and Scorcu, 2003). It 
should be noted that, in general, more studies identify the existence of the ‘declining price’ 
anomaly (e.g. Agnello and Pierce, 1996; Pesando and Shum, 1996). 
 
          As violin price formation is a very fine-grained and complex process, the list of violin 
price determinants encompasses probably even more aspects. However, I do believe that 
the most important factors have been introduced in this section. It should be also noted that 
many of them play also an important part in determining the financial performance of 
violins.  
         Some, specially the latest mentioned, phenomena are difficult to track in a dataset with 
as many observations as the one I completed, but it is important to mention in order to better 
understand the complex market we are analyzing. 
 
 
43  Bidders’ values are affiliated (or common) when bidder’s valuation of the object is correlated with valuations 
of other auction participants (Keser and Olson, 1996). 
 
